Sale of Corporeal Moveables in Scots Law by Stevenson, Margaret
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
 
 
 
 
Theses Digitisation: 
https://www.gla.ac.uk/myglasgow/research/enlighten/theses/digitisation/ 
This is a digitised version of the original print thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge 
 
This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, 
title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten: Theses 
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
research-enlighten@glasgow.ac.uk 
SALE OF CORPOREAL MOVEABLES IN SCOTS LAW 
A THESIS PRESENTED BY 
MARGARET STEVENSON M.A. , LL.B.
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF LAWS
FACULTY OF LAW AND FINANCIAL STUDIES 
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW JUNE 1986.
ProQuest Number: 10907204
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10907204
Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I should like to record my thanks to my Supervisor 
Professor D. M. Walker who gave very generously of his 
time at all stages in the preparation of this Thesis. .
I am also indebted to my husband Jim for many hours 
spent at his word processor.
CONTENTS
Page No
SUMMftRY 1
INTRODUCTION 3
SECTION I - ROMAN LAW OF SALE 10
SECTION II - SCOTS LAW UP TO 1893 28
1- Passing of property 29
2- Passing of risk 33
3- Warrandice against faults 38
1- Redhibition 38
2- Actio quanti minoris? 53
4- Warrandice against eviction 62
SECTION III - ENGLISH LAW UP TO 1893 76
1- Passing of property 78
2- Passing of risk 82
3- Conditions and warranties 84
1. General 84
2- Warranty of quality 85
3- Remedies for breach of warranty 98
4- Warranty of title 101
SECTION IV - SALE OF GDDDS ACT 1893 110
1. Property provisions 111
1. Risk 111
2- Passing of Property
2- Quality provisions 136
1. Section 13 137
2- Section 14 146
3- Remedies for breach of warranty 155
of quality
SECTION V ~ THE LEGACY 166
CONCLUSIONS 178
BIBLIOGRAPHY 181
1SUMMARY
Section I outlines the Roman law of sale, on which the 
law in Scotland before 1893 was largely based. An 
examination of Roman law is essential to an 
understanding of the differences between the English 
and Scottish laws of sale. These basic differences 
between the two systems have great relevance to the 
unfortunate situation which exists today in sale of 
goods legislation.
Section II deals with Scots common law on corporeal 
moveables before the Sale of Boods Act 1893. The basic 
principles, mainly derived from Roman law, are 
illustrated by reference to the works of authoritative 
writers and case law. The main emphasis is on passing 
of risk and property, and warrandice against faults. 
The conclusion drawn is that while the common law 
would have been by no means ideally suited to modern 
commercial conditions, it had the advantages of clear 
basic principles, flexibility, and was of course 
consistent with other branches of Scots law.
Section III examines the English common law of sale 
before 1893. The conclusions drawn are that the cases 
were often confused and conflicting and that the law 
was not ready for codification. The law had developed
2from empirical situations where "something had gone 
wrong", rather than being built upon general basic 
principles as was the Scottish system- The 
fundamental aspects of the English law are discussed 
with special reference to the passing of property, the 
principle of caveat ernptor, and warranties and 
conditions.
Section IV deals with the Sale of Goods Act 1893, 
attempting to identify the areas of the law which are 
most problematical. Some of these were inherent in 
the English law, and some have been created because of 
the imposition of alien and, in Scots law terms, 
meaningless English rules. Property provisions and 
quality provisions are discussed with special 
reference to the problems inherent in Section 13 and 
Section 14, and to the position as regards remedies.
Section V, "The Legacy", looks at the state of the 
law today and modern developments such as the Romalpa 
clause, and the problem of minor defects. The 
conclusion is drawn that it is unlikely that 
"tinkering" with the concepts of merchantable quality 
and fitness for purpose as they appear in the 1979 Act 
would give the law relevance to the kind of contracts 
which constitute the majority of sales today- It is 
more likely that the necessary changes can only be 
effected by new statutory formulations more 
appropriate to modern trading and commercial 
conditions.
INTRODUCTION
In 1893 an "Act for codifying the law relating to the 
Sale of Goods" was passed by Parliament, its 
provisions to extend to Scotland. This Act was indeed 
a codification of the common law as it stood in 
England, but did not represent the law of Scotland. 
The draftsman of the Act was Sir Mackenzie Chalmers, 
whose purpose in drawing up the Act was to reproduce 
the existing English law. In fact Scotland had, up to 
1893, a separate and, in many fundamental aspects, a 
different set of common law principles in the area of 
sale. So basically different were the two systems in 
this field that Professor Mackintosh in the preface to 
the first edition of his Roman taw of Sale f1892) 
clearly felt that there was no question of the bill 
(as it then was) extending to Scotland:
“The application to Scotland of a Bill 
based exclusively on English case law with a 
few saving clauses interjected would be 
productive of more confusion than 
advantage. If the legislative desire of the 
mercantile community for an assimilation of 
the law of sale in the two countries is to 
be given effect in a satisfactory manner, it 
is essential that there should be^ adequate 
enquiry and mature consideration before a 
consolidating statute is passed."
Richard Brown recognised that while "...it requires no
4argument to prove the convenience of assimilation when
it can „ be accomplished without counteracting
disadvantage -..in the case of sale special
1
difficulties present themselves...“ Long before the
bill and its problems became a live issue, li. P. Brown
in his Treatise on the Law of Sale(1821) had written
2
these prophetic words:
"...it is ...certain that, in a great many 
important particulars touching the nature 
and constitution of the contract of sale, as 
well as its effects, the law of Scotland is 
different from the laws of other countries 
and particularly from the law of England. 
While, therefore, it cannot be denied that 
the most beneficial consequences have 
resulted from the use of the foreign 
authorities, it is evident at the same time 
that the use of them must be kept within due 
bounds, and that unless it is restricted to 
matters in which the foreign law is truly 
analogous to the law of Scotland, the 
practice now alluded to will have no other 
effect than to mislead, and to introduce 
both confusion in principle and practical 
in justice. *'
As J.J.Gow reapeatedly points out, it is hard to 
understand how it happened that the 1893 Act was 
allowed to extend to Scotland. An important factor was
certainly the death of Lord President Inglis in 1891.
3
He was (as "its venerable and venerated chief" ) a 
passionate defender of the Scottish legal system 
generally, and he was in particular opposed to the 
transfer of real rights by mere agreement (an 
important feature of the 1893 Act but not a principle 
of Scots common law). Lord Watson — one of the 
"Scottish collaborators" (so called by the Scottish
s 4
Law Commision) — supported the policy of assimilating 
A
5the laws of Scotland and England and the bill was 
rushed through its stages without proper consideration 
or discussion of the differences that existed between 
the English and Scottish systems, far less any attempt 
being made to forecast future difficulties. There 
seems to have been amazingly little regret about the 
new Act, even among those who had had the insight to 
foresee the problems that would be created. Professor 
Mackintosh, by the time of his second edition of The 
Roman Law of Sale in 1907 seems no longer to be 
unhappy about the Act extending across the border. 
Along with the Act he includes in the 1907 edition a
memorandum which was attached to the bill when it
first went before Parliament in 1892 and which ran:
"The Bill does not extend to Scotland. The 
law of Scotland with respect to the sale of 
goods differs in many important respects 
from the law of England. Hence a merely 
codifying Bill could not extend to both 
countries."
In a footnote to this memorandum Mackintosh explains
that what he calls "the necessary changes" were made
so that the Act might apply to Scotland, i.e."a number
of saving clauses and certain new clauses confined to
Scotland" were added. Indeed in his preface to the
second edition he seems to feel that Roman Law could
learn something from the Sale of Goods Act " ...its
practical and well considered order may suggest a
scheme for rearranging the scattered learning of the
5
Roman titles on more systematic lines." Richard Brown 
also, in the preface to the first edition of his
6Treatise on the Sale of Goodsi1895), lacks any rancour 
as he describes his aims
"...bo explain the important and almost 
revolutionary changes made by the Act upon 
the principles and practice of the Scottish 
law of Sale."
Indeed, he deemed it an honour, so he states in the 
preface, to be associated with the draftsman of the 
bill while it was pas^.ng through Parliament "...in an 
endeavour to adapt the measure to Scottish 
requirements." However, early in his Treatise he 
does say that:
11 ...in balancing expediency our
legislators have deemed it better to 
assimilate the law, even at the sacrifice of 
more logical and better defined principles."
Contemporary Scottish legal writers are not so
restrained when contemplating what happened in 1893,
and are in agreement as to the disastrous effects on
our common law of the imposition of the Act. Comments
range from the quietly understated findings of the
Scottish Law Commision that the provisions of the 1893
Act"...have not been adequately harmonised with the
7
common law of Scotland" to the impassioned outbursts 
of J.J.Gow, such as:
"Before 1893 we had a law of sale
admirably suited to imaginative development 
in the consumer society in which we now 
live. For no intelligible reason, and 
apparently without protest, we suffered to
be imposed upon our country a highly 
technical law of sale constructed for
bargaining between merchants and indifferent 
to the needs of the lay consumer. Ever 
since as a profession we have made no 
scientific attempt to investigate the social
7•facts and ascertain whether this system
8
meets the requirements of our society"
and,
"Cthe law of sale of goods!! has become 
sadly distorted by the imposition on our law 
of an alien and inimical statute. The
9 7
result has been a fruitless mesaiHence."
It may be argued that as this "English code" has now
been part of our law for more than 90 years, it is
pointless and unrealistic to look back to the pre— 1893
Scottish common law position. Generations of Scottish
students of law have studied unquestioningly the
provisions of the 1893 Act (now the 1979 Act) perhaps
without truly appreciating that it does not accord
with the rest of the Scottish legal system, and that
it has produced internal inconsistency in our legal
principles, as the Act does not apply to incorporeal
moveables, barter nor heritage. However, just because
we "allowed ignoble capitulation to English 
10
dominance" to overcome us in 1893, does not mean 
that in possible future formulations of a more 
satisfactory code for the United Kingdom, a true 
harmonisation of the two systems should not be 
attempted. On the other hand, it is possible to 
over— dramatise the situation. Whilst it is easy for 
Scots lawyers to affirm that our rules of common law 
in this area are superior to those of the 1893 Act, 
they would not have proved ideally suited to solve 
problems posed by modern commerce, and (contrary to 
what Gow would appear to hold) it has been pointed out
8S'
by the Scottish Law Commission that:
"... a simple restoration of the pre 1894 
common law of sale would by no means solve 
11
all problems"
Bow writes of the need to "revivify" our old law of
sale of moveables, but he would appear to be rather
over optimistic in his assertion that we could improve
the situation simply by choosing to exert the
personality of our legal system, so to speak. To make
a realistic appraisal of the situation it is necessary
to accept that the Sale of Goods Act is binding in our
system in certain situations, and to realise that
12
closing our eyes and "hoping it will go away" is not
13
a helpful approach. Gow states :
"Our common law with its healthy instinct 
for simplicity and efficiency is always 
current if we choose to make it so"
This is true, but only where it is not inconsistent 
with statutes of the United Kingdom Parliament. It is 
of course plain that the policy behind the Act, that 
of having a common code in this field for the United 
Kingdom, is the only possible option. In examining
the merits of the pre-1893 Scots law of sale of
corporeal moveables one does not argue against the
concept of a common code for the United Kingdom. It is 
merely claimed that what should have been attempted 
(and perhaps still should be) was reconci1iation of 
the two systems. We should however beware of becoming 
insular and over— reacting to the English “threat"; 
while recognising the advantages of our own system we
9must attempt to see a broader picture of harmonisation 
in the -future. Our membership of the E.E.C. and the 
facts of international commerce mean that only a 
flexible approach will be conducive to evolving a 
satisfactory system.
The aim of this paper will be to look back at the 
law of Scotland before 1B93, to examine the effects of 
the Sale of Goods Act of that year on our common law 
and to assess the current problematical state of the 
law of corporeal moveables in Scotland.
1. 1891 3 Jur. Rev. pp.297-8
2. At pp.1-2
3. the Juridical Review, noting his death
4. Memorandum No. 25, August 1976, p. 34
5. at pp.vi,vii
6. p.4
7. Memorandum No.26, August 1976, p.2
8. The Mercantile and Industrial Law of Scotland, 
preface p.viii
9. op.cit. ,p.73
10. J.J.Gow
11. Memorandum No.25, p.2
12. as Gow appears to do, for example in his article 
Warrandice in Sale 19 S.L.T. (News) 137
13. The Mercantile and Industrial Law of Scotland, 
p. 75
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SECTION I - ROMAN LAW OF SALE
The common law of the sale of corporeal moveables in 
Scotland is largely based on Roman law; in order 
therefore to appreciate fully the underlying 
principles of Scots law up to 1894, and the essential 
differences between that system and the English law of 
sale, it is necessary to outline briefly the main 
features of the Roman law of sale. Many of these have 
great relevance to the unfortunate situation which 
exists in this area of the law today.
Sale, emptio vend itio, was a common contract and of 
great commercial importance in Roman law. The 
contract is one whereby two parties, one the buyer and 
one the seller, agree respectively the one to transfer 
a thing and the other to pay an agreed price for that 
thing. It was one of the consensual contracts, that 
is the mere agreement is binding. It was also 
completely obligational - the contract itself did not 
transfer ownerships the seller undertook to transfer 
possession of a thing to the buyer who undertook to 
pay a sum of money. Roman law made a clear
1. All references are to the bibliography at the end 
of this section
11
distinction between conveyance (e.g.traditio) and the 
causa - in this case the sale.
No particular form was required to establish the 
agreement, but two forms of evidence were extensively 
used: arra and writing. The former represented in
post-classical times a substantial portion of the 
purchase price “ to bind the bargain." This could, in 
case of breach, be treated as liquidated damages. If 
the agreement was to be in writing there was held to 
be no binding contract until a document was drawn up. 
Until then the parties could resile, but only if no 
arra had been given. If arra had been used to seal 
the bargain, then the buyer who withdrew forfeited 
this, while a seller in breach of his obligations had 
to repay double the amount of arra given.
SUBJECT MATTER
Subject to certain legal requirements (mainly as 
regards persons acting in fiduciary positions) sale of 
virtually anything was possible. A future thing could 
be sold, for example " my next year's crop." A sale 
of what was not in commercio (e.g. a free man) was 
void. Since sale was wholly obligational there was 
nothing to prevent the sale of a third person's
12
property: this situation gave rise to a valid
contract.
I-f the goods had, unknown to both parties, ceased to 
exist at the time the contract was made, it was void. 
Where the goods had been partially destroyed the buyer 
could recover his money only where less than half of 
the goods were left, or where he could show that the 
missing portion was the portion for which he bought 
the thing. Otherwise the contact stood and the price 
was proportionally reduced.
The transaction was called emptio spei when what was 
being sold was something which did not as yet exist, 
or where the quantity or value of the thing was 
indeterminate. Emptio spei simpl i d s  described the 
situation where the parties intended the price to be 
paid whether the hoped for goods materialised or not, 
for example, an agreement to buy the fish to be caught 
in a particular net, or the minerals to be extracted 
from a mine to be opened. If the intention was that 
the price should not be paid unless something existed 
to sell (i.e. the purchase of a future thing 
conditional on its coming into existence) the contract 
was emptio rei speratae, for example the lambs to be 
born to particular ewes the following spring.
13
THE PRICE
In classical law this had to be fixed in money,
otherwise it would not be possible to distinguish sale 
from other transactions. To have the benefit of legal 
remedies the price had to be real, but it did not 
require to be economic. It must not however be
absurdly low or the question of donation arose. 
Justinian settled a legal controversy by enacting that 
where the parties left the price to be fixed by a 
determinate third person the contract was binding at
the price set by that person, but if he declined or
was unable to fix the price the contract was void.The 
price must be certum. It was not sale if no price was 
fixed nor if it was agreed to sell "at a fair price."
THE SELLER *S DUTIES
These arose once the contract was perfects, that is 
when identity, quality and quantity of the thing were 
ascetained, also price and any suspensive conditions 
were fulfilled. His main duties were to exercise 
exacts di 2 igentia over the goods sold until he 
delivered them at the required time and place,
14
together with any fruits or accessions which had 
accrued since the sale became perfects. He was 
therefore responsible for all loss, damage,
destruction, deterioration, theft etc. which could 
have been prevented had he taken the necessary
precautions expected of a circumspect man of business
accustomed to dealing with goods of the kind in
question. He was not liable if the loss or 
deterioration was due to accident or human action 
beyond his control, unless he was guilty of wrongful 
delay in delivery. On the other hand if the buyer 
wrongfully delayed acceptance of the goods the seller 
was no longer bound to exercise any high degree of 
care over them.
Delivery meant putting the purchaser in possession 
of the goods by giving him the means of appropriating 
them (as in the standard example of delivery of the 
keys of a warehouse in which the goods were stored). 
If the goods were extremely large, delivery was deemed 
to have been effected by the buyer putting his mark on 
them.
The seller had to deliver undisturbed possession; he 
had no obligation to give ownership. The buyer could 
not refuse to take the goods if he discovered that 
they did not belong to the seller, nor could he sue 
him or rescind the contract (though he could of course 
do so if deprived of possession by a third party with
15
title to the goods). That this was the case was due 
to practical considerations: in general no distinction 
was made between moveables and immoveables. The need 
to prove title to something would have created great 
difficulties, which , in view of the common nature of 
the contract, would have hindered business and 
commerce (possession would in any case, unless the 
thing was stolen, soon develop into dominium through 
usucapio), The seller had however a duty to guarantee 
the buyer against eviction. This guarantee evolved 
through various stages of development. It began with 
the actio auctoritat is under which a seller who made a 
mancipatio was liable for double the price if he 
failed to defend the buyer against claims by third 
parties. It became the practice where the goods were 
not mancipated, or where the sale was of a res nee 
eancipi to require the seller to promise to pay double 
the price in case of eviction (stipulatio duplae). In 
cases where the goods sold were of small value the 
stipulation was only habere licere (simple 
indemnity).
Because of the bona fide nature of sale and the 
common practice of making express stipulations, it 
became accepted that it was not good faith to fail to 
give the undertakings. It became the very essence of 
sale that the buyer should have permanent enjoyment of 
the property and should be fully indemnified if he 
lost it through a defective title given by the
seller. The buyer could, by the actio empti, recover 
the amount that would have been due on the 
stipulation. This developed into the situation where, 
by the time of Justinian, liability was implied and 
the buyer's rights always enforceable by the actio 
empti i.e. there was an implied warranty of title in 
every contract of sale in the classical law.
The seller's liability therefore could be of two 
kinds: the implied liability of the actio empti or an 
express stipulation under the stipulatio duplae. 
Action on the latter was for double the price, whereas 
the former could redress losses of the purchaser up to 
any amount until Justinian provided that this should 
never exceed double the price paid. The stipulatio 
duplae lay only if there had been actual eviction, in 
the form of a judgement under which the buyer had had 
to give up the thing, or pay damages. The stipulatio 
duplae could apply where there had been no actual 
eviction but the buyer had lost the benefit of his 
bargain(e.g. he still had possession of the goods 
only because he had been obliged to compensate the 
real owner and had thus paid twice).
In the actio empti the seller was bound to indemnify 
the purchaser for all loss following on his being 
deprived of possession. The measure of damages was 
generally the market value of the goods at the time of 
eviction, which meant that it was possible to recover
more or less than had been paid in the original 
transaction. The buyer could be compensated for loss 
of profits which he would have gained through the 
property if he had not been evicted. The seller must 
have been responsible for the defect in title and the 
defect must have existed at the time of the contract.
Also gradually evolving was the seller's liability 
to warrant against latent defects in the goods - 
patent defects were of course taken as being accepted 
by the buyer. Other than the very old actio de modo 
agri (which lay where the seller had overstated the 
extent of mancipated land) there was little a 
purchaser could do to remedy the situation when he 
discovered undisclosed defects. It was dolus and 
actionable under the actio empti not to declare known 
important defects, but this did not afford much 
protection because of the necessity to prove 
knowledge. The seller was liable if the goods did not 
match the description he had innocently given of 
them. His liability was for the difference in value 
between the thing as it was, and as described. For 
fraudulent misdescription he was liable for the 
buyer's full interesse.
The position in the early law was therefore that a 
purchaser who wanted to be safeguarded against 
defects, had to extract an express stipulation from 
the seller. Whether or not he was able to do this
would depend on the circumstances, i.e. it would be 
easier in a "buyer's market."
The curule aediles who exercised a kind of policing 
function over the markets, took the law a stage 
further by their edicts (dates unknown) on the public 
sale of slaves (slave dealers had a bad reputation) 
and livestock. These edicts changed the nature of 
warranty which had been a matter of pure agreement 
between the parties. They provided that in the case 
of sale of a slave the seller must disclose, by 
displaying them on a board, any of a long list of 
defects (moral and physical) and must also declare him 
to be free of any other defects, and to be not a 
roamer or a runaway. If defects appeared, or if the 
seller's representations proved to be untrue, the 
buyer had two remedies: firstly the actio redhibitoria 
which prescribed in six months from the time of the 
sale or from the detection of a fault which could not 
have been discovered sooner, and was available to set 
the contract aside; and secondly, the actio quanti 
minoris for damages which lay for twelve months (and 
was possibly only available for lesser defects). 
Under the actio quanti minoris the purchaser could 
recover the difference in value between the slave as 
he was and the price which he had paid for him, that 
is, under this actio the buyer kept the goods and 
claimed for a reduction of the price proportionate to 
the defects which came to light. The edict also
contained a general clause against dolus*
The edict on livestock was similar; in both edicts 
the fact that the seller was unaware of the defects 
was irrelevant. The general rule was that there were 
grounds for a successful action when the defect was a 
hindrance to the use or service for which the slave or 
beast had been purchased. The defect had to exist at 
the time of sale and be unknown to the purchaser.
These edicts operated in a limited field - outside 
these restricted cases there was still the need to 
resort to stipulations to protect against defects. 
When and how the provisions of the edicts were 
extended to all sales is not known. It has been 
surmised (by Buckland p.492) that the extension may 
have been gradual, first to slaves and livestock not 
in open market, and then to all sales and all sorts of 
defects.
The buyer's rights under the edictal provisions 
could be varied by agreement: sales in which
warranties were excluded were called venditiones 
sisplar iae.
Thus evolved the important Roman law doctrine of 
implied warranty of sound quality — the idea that the 
seller is responsible for latent faults, his ignorance 
being immaterial whether excusable or not.
THE PURCHASER'S DUTIES
His main obligation was to pay the price and only when 
he had done so did the property vest in him, even if 
the goods had been delivered (apart from agreements 
for security or credit). The price had to be paid 
with interest if the buyer were in »ora, together with 
expenses incurred bona fide by the vendor between the 
time of contract and delivery. Usually the buyer was 
bound to collect the goods, as the place of delivery 
was, in the absence of agreement to the contrary, the 
place where the thing presently was. If there were 
any question of the goods having to be returned to the 
seller, the purchaser's duty was to show exacta 
di1igentia in respect of them.
PASSING OF OWNERSHIP AND RISK
Once the contract was perfecta risk in the thing sold 
passed to the buyer, who was still liable to pay the 
price even if the goods perished before delivery by 
casus or vis maior, or deteriorated without fault of
the seller. Ownership did not pass until delivery; 
this illogical separation of ownership and risk in 
Roman law has given rise to numerous attempts to 
justify, or at least explain it. (This rule is of 
course different from the usual Roman rule res perit 
domino).The fact that the rule survived has caused 
some scholars (e.g. Buckland) to conclude that it must 
have corresponded with commercial needs. The 
Institutes offer the explanation that as the buyer was 
entitled to accretions before delivery he should also 
bear the risk. Pothier's (not very convincing) 
explanation (Moyle p.91) lies in the consensual 
character of the contract: the buyer has promised the 
price in exchange not for the seller's conveyance but 
for his promise to convey, and if the seller has been 
prevented from fulfilling his promise, that is no 
reason why the buyer also should fail in his duty when 
performance remains possible. This theory however 
does not appear to have practical relevance to a 
working legal system: it might prove difficult to
explain to a buyer caught by the rule that he had 
bargained not for a cart but for a promise of one! 
Moyle (p.90) refers to Sluck's view that the rule was 
based on equity:
"If the vendor is bound to show the 
greatest possible care in the charge of the 
property from the moment that the contract 
is binding, so that he is answerable for any 
loss, damage or deterioration which the 
exercise of such care could have prevented, 
it is only reasonable that if it is lost, 
destroyed, or damaged before delivery 
without his fault, he should nevertheless be
22
entitled to the purchase money."
T.B. Smith (p.25) finds de Page's explanation 
plausible. It runs along the lines that when Rome was 
the centre of a great trading empire the seller abroad 
had to be assured of payment whether delivery was 
safely effected in Rome or not and as Roman law had no 
concept of insurance the risk of loss was placed on 
buyers. The obvious flaw in this argument is of 
course that the rule applied also to all domestic 
transactions. Nicholas (p.179) defends the rule as 
corresponding to economic facts: until the contract is 
complete the seller retains an economic interest, once 
the contract has been completed the seller, though he 
still has a legal interest in the goods, has no 
further economic interest in them. If there is a rise 
in the market price it is the buyer who may take 
advantage of it by selling the goods on to a third 
party.
Perhaps the simplest explanation lies in the history 
of mancipatio which was originally a cash sale and 
conveyance combined, by which ownership and risk 
passed together. Its development as a conveyance may 
have led to the separation of risk and ownership. 
This separation gave rise to the requirement to define 
the moment at which the contract was complete so that 
risk could pass. There were a number of detailed 
rules but the general principle was that nothing 
should remain to be done except deliver the goods and
23
pay the price.
The rule as to risk could be excluded by agreement. 
In a conditional sale risk did not pass to the buyer 
until the condition(s) had been fulfilled, and if the 
goods were destroyed before then the contract was 
void. In a sale of fungibles, at so much per unit, to 
be weighed out or measured, risk did not pass until 
the particular quantity in question had been 
appropriated to the contract. The general rule that 
dolus and mora always carried risk applied. Risk did 
not pass to the purchaser where the loss, destruction 
etc. could have been avoided if the seller had taken 
due care of the goods, nor where the damage resulted 
from the seller's delay in delivering them.
As regards the passing of property in Roman law 
ownership could never pass before delivery. A 
distinction was maintained between contract and 
conveyance, with the result that ownership did not 
pass to the buyer when the contract was made, but when 
the goods were actually conveyed - the maxim was 
traditionibus non nudis pact is dominia rerum 
transferuntur* Where credit had not been given 
however, not even delivery passed ownership until the 
price was paid or security given for it.
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GENERAL
The obligations in a contract of sale were concurrent, 
which meant that neither party could succeed in an 
action against the other for non-performance unless he 
had either done his own part, or had been willing to 
perform on receiving performance from the other 
party. Apart from the special remedies on 
stipulations and under the edicts, the usual actions 
on a contract of sale were the actio venditi for the 
seller and the actio empti for the buyer. The measure 
of damages and the extent to which remoteness of 
damage was taken into account pose difficulties. Some 
texts indicate that any loss however remote was taken 
into account; others state that large claims not 
foreseeable by the seller were excluded. It has been 
argued that classical law imposed no limit on 
remoteness of damage, but Buckland states that this 
argument is extreme and that the classical law 
probably had a rule limiting claims on the ground of 
remoteness (but it is not known what it was).
As in any bona fide contract the obligations could 
be varied by agreement, subject to the rule that 
liability for dolus could not be excluded.
There were a number of commonly used agreements in
25
the law of sale: a lex commissar ia was an agreement to 
the effect that if the price were not paid by a 
certain time the seller could declare the sale void. 
The condition could be framed, as suspensive or 
resolutive - more often the latter so that risk was 
usually borne by the buyer. In diem addictio was an 
agreement that the seller would be entitled to resile 
from the contract if a better offer was received 
within a stated time. If he intended to accept a 
better offer the seller was obliged to give the buyer 
the opportunity of matching it. Pactum pro timesios 
was a right of pre-emption which gave the seller the
option of buying back the thing sold at the price 
offered by any other bidder if the buyer were
re-selling it. There were in addition pacts which 
operated in favour of the buyer. The pactum
retroemendo was an undertaking by the seller to 
re-purchase the goods in certain circumstances if
required by the buyer to do so. The emptio ad gustum
and pactum displicentiae were two forms of arranging 
sale on approval. In sale of some commodities (e.g. 
wine) it was common practice to provide that the 
contract should be subject to sample within a short
period. The condition was normally 'suspensive, the
risk remaining with the seller until the date agreed 
or until the buyer signified his approval. In some 
cases (e.g. sale of slaves) there could be a much 
longer trial period — two months where no period was
specified - this condition was usually resolutive.
26
In Section II the importance of the above principles 
in the development of the Scots law of sale will be 
demonstrated.
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SECTION II - SCOTS LAW UP TO 1893
The Scots law of sale - "a contract for transferring
1
property in consideration of a price in money" — 
developed from the foundations laid down by Roman Law; 
that is, it evolved according to legal principle and 
not on the basis of empiricism. The general rules of 
contract law applied; the main features of the law of 
sale which differentiated the Scottish system from 
that of England will be dealt with as follows:
1. Passing of property
2. Passing of risk
3. Warrandice against faults
1. Redhibition
2. Actio quanti minoris?
4. Warrandice against eviction
29
1. PASSING OF PROPERTY
As noted in Section I, in Roman law the contract of 
sale never transferred property in a things the 
contract itself did not operate as a conveyance- The 
contract was a consensual one which could be completed 
by simple agreement without delivery, but property in 
the goods was not transferred to the seller at the 
time of making the contract- Scots common law 
followed the Roman principles: what was necessary to 
change ownership was delivery and so great emphasis 
was placed on possession which was regarded as “the 
badge of ownership" from which property was presumed-
The direct influence of Roman law is seen in Bell's
Principles where he deals with sale: "Sale as a
contract is contradistinguished from sale as a
transference. The contract of sale when completed, is,
in the law of Scotland, nothing more than the titulus
a
tr ansferendi domi/Sii with obligations on either part 
to pay the price and to deliver the thing sold- No
property passes till delivery; nothing but the ius ad
2
rein specificam- " After the contract was concluded the
30
buyer had the right to demand the property in the 
thing sold - a merely personal right which he had 
before delivery.
The word property in Scots law gives rise to no 
problem of terminology — it means ownership or 
dominium as opposed to the personal right of 
obligation: "...the sovereign or primary real right is
that of property; which is the right of using and
disposing of a subject as our own, except in so far as
3
we are restrained by law or paction." The English 
common law rule is that possession of goods is prima 
facie evidence of title; however possession is 
regarded as an ambiguous state of affairs which may 
well represent deposit or goods in the control of a 
carrier or a servant etc.
The seller, then, remained the owner until delivery
had taken place and he could validly sell the goods to
a second buyer who was bona fide. The second buyer's
right could not be called in question by the first
buyer who had only a personal action against the
4
seller for damages for breach of contract. This meant 
that before the Mercantile Law Amendment Act 
(Scotland) 1856 a seller's creditors could seize goods 
sold but not yet delivered and were not bound to 
recognise any right in the buyer. The common law 
policy favoured recognition of rights of ownership 
(rather than the English concept of a hierarchy of
31
rights based on better title to possess) and so until
a real right had been transferred the buyer was liable
to have his right to the subject of sale defeated.
Even if he had paid in advance he would only be
entitled to a dividend in the event of the seller's
bankruptcy if the goods had not been delivered.Lord
Justice-Clerk Hope did not see any injustice in the
seller's creditors' claim to goods which had been paid
for, but not delivered. In 1844 he said in this
5
context in Boak v. Megget "The principle of the
Scotch law is both recommended by practical justice
and by expediency." This case concerned hides left
with a tanner for treatment in circumstances where
most of the price had been paid. Again, in Anderson 
6
v. Buchanan he said "Our law is, in the most
fundamental points of doctrine and practice respecting
the law of ownership and the effect of possession of
moveables, essentially different from the law of
England, and we are apt to forget our own very clear
and far superior rules." Richard Brown obviously had
much sympathy with these views. Writing after the
enactment of the 1893 Act he said "...our legislators
have deemed it better to assimilate the law even at
the sacrifice of more logical and better defined 
7
principles."
In the period between the 1856 and 1893 Acts, the 
Scottish rules as regards passing of property were 
stoutly defended by the courts as being preferable to
32
8
the encroaching English law- However in the middle of
the last century some recognised that the Scots rule
as to the implications of possession were unsuited to
increasingly complex commercial transactions- Bell in
his posthumously published book on Sale refers to
the rule which existed before 1856 as regards the
seller's creditors where goods had been sold but not
delivered "... in the Scottish Claw! the creditors are
entitled to consider the property as still
untransferred from the seller, leaving the buyer to
claim as a personal creditor for the price, if paid
...or for damages for nondelivery. This is an unhappy
and unjust consequence of the general principle of the
Scottish law..." Lord Ivory was of a similar
persuasion as evidenced by his famous minority opinion
10
in Shearer v. Christie where he stated "Creditors
are bound to know that many honest occasions of
possession may arise in the daily complications of
human affairs without any radical title of property on
which they would be safe to rely as a ground of
credit." This passage, indicating as it does,a desire
for a change to the Scottish rule was several times
quoted and approved in cases in the period which led
11
up to the 1893 Act.
The 1856 Act did not affect the passing of property 
in goods but made provision for conferring priorities 
on buyers and sub-purchasers in certain 
circumstances. It was intended "...to remedy some of
33
the inconveniences of the common law rules regarding
the interests of creditors in the property sold,
without impinging on the general law affecting
12
delivery and its consequences..." Section 1 provided
that where goods had been sold but not yet delivered
to the purchaser it was not competent for the seller's
creditors to attach the goods sold to prevent the
purchaser froi^ enforcing delivery- Section 2 provided
that where a purchaser who had not received delivery
of the goods nevertheless resold them to a third
party, his purchaser and any subsequent purchasers
were to be entitled to demand delivery and the seller,
on intimation to him of the state of affairs, was
obliged on payment of the price to deliver the goods
to the subsequent purchaser and was not entitled to
hold the goods against any separate alleged debt owed
13
by the original purchaser- Gow sets out clearly the 
position in Scots law (including the effect of the 
Factors (Scotland) Act 1890) immediately prior to 1 
January 1894-
2. PASSING DF RISK 
14
Risk is defined by Gow as
"-..the patrimonial loss suffered by the 
seller or the buyer as the case may be by 
reason of the physical destruction of the 
goods or such damage thereto that they cease 
to be of the kind described by the contract 
under such circumstances that the party 
suffering the loss is not thereby released 
from performing his obligations under the 
contract."
Scots common law rules were taken from Roman law and
as noted in Section I, this involves the risk of a
thing sold, but not yet delivered, transferring to the
buyer (per iculum rei vertditae nondum traditae est
15
emptoris). Once the contract was perfecta the risk 
fell on the buyer. That is, after the contract is 
made but before delivery, if the goods were lost, 
stolen, destroyed or damaged (without any fault on the 
seller's part) the buyer was still liable to pay the 
price; it was he who had to bear the loss.
It is interesting in passing to note that in areas
still regulated by the common law of Scotland (e.g.
sale of heritage, exchange) the Roman rule applies,
16
and risk passes on conclusion of a contract.
In Stair's time there seem to have been doubts as to
whether the Roman rule had indeed been incorporated 
17
into Scots law but from the mid 18th century it is 
clear that this strange feature of Roman law was also 
a part of Scots law. Some of the earlier cases to be 
found in the texts, as supporting this proposition are 
far from clear on the points in some delivery had
35
taken place; also problems arose when delivery was 
stipulated to take place at somewhere different -from
the place of sale or where shipping the goods was
18
involved. However the case of McDonald v.
19
Hutcheson in 1744 is clear on the point. H bought 
spirits by bidding at a roup. Next day when he went 
to demand delivery he was told that the goods had been 
stolen in the night. H pleaded that as the goods had
never been delivered to him it would be "against the
principles of equity to make him liable for the price 
when the thing sold had perished by no fault of his." 
He argued that in a case such as this each party to 
the contract should bear his own loss — the seller 
having no right to the price and the buyer no action 
for damages. He conceded that the "Doctors of the
civil law have...laid it down for a rule that by the 
sale the risk of the subject sold is transferred from 
the seller to the buyer" but he argued that this was 
"never received to be the law of this country... as
observed by Lord Stair." M answered that the sale was 
completed - there was no ground in equity upon which 
the buyer could be relieved, when the bargain was 
complete risk passed. This argument was upheld.
20
In 1749 Melvil v. Robertson was also unambiguous: 
"as by the Roman law, so by ours, per iculum rei 
venditae est emptoris...if the thing sold perish casu
Cthe buyer! must nevertheless be liable in the
pri ce."
36
Numerous cases in the 19th century also leave no
21
doubt as to the law- In Hall v- Armstrong tea was
put on a ship at London- When the cases arrived at
Leith sawdust had been substituted -for the tea. It
was held that the purchaser was liable to pay the
22
price- In Hansen v- Craig a cargo of oil, weighed 
and ready for delivery, was sold. Bought and sold 
notes were exchanged stating the number of tons of oil 
involved and the price- It was to be delivered where 
it was lying. Before the buyer took delivery most of 
the oil was accidentally burned. It was held that as 
the contract was complete risk had passed to the 
purchaser. Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis said "we must 
decide according to the principles of the law of 
Scotland, and the rules as to risk which we have 
adopted from the Roman law."
Sometimes referred to in the cases is Erskine's
justification of the rule: "...the property which
continues in the seller before delivery is but
nominal; he is truly no better than the keeper of the
23
subject for behoof of the purchaser." It is 
submitted that it is advisable not to look too deeply 
into this analysis for fear of finding that we are 
splitting the concept of property as English law 
does. However illogical the rule, and inequitable the 
results, the position was that property and risk were 
separated.
Where goods were to be sold by weight, number or
measure, and had not yet been separated from a bulk of
the commodity in question, the risk was not on the
buyer. "The ascertainment of the subject so as to
complete the contract and change the risk... is
accomplished by the separation and setting apart of
the subject for the buyer, with notice to him that it
24 25
is so set apart." Anderson v. Walls is a clear
illustration of the point. The purchaser bought 750
gallons of oil to be delivered when required. No oil
was set aside or stored separately for the purchaser.
All the oil on the seller's premises was destroyed by
fire. At that time 713 gallons of oil bought by the
purchaser had not been delivered. It was held that
the purchaser had no right to demand delivery of any
specific portion of the oil destroyed by fire, and no
risk had passed to him. He was entitled to delivery
of 713 gallons of oil.
26
M.P. Brown lists several exceptions to the general 
rule as regards risk:
1. When the seller was in nor a by not delivering 
the goods as agreed the risk did not pass. (If 
both parties were in nor a the risk was on the 
purchaser).
2. When the loss had occurred through the seller's
38
negligence the risk did not pass. He was bound
to take care of the thing until it was
delivered. Difficulties occurred (giving rise
to much litigation) when it was necessary to
send the goods to the buyer with a carrier or by
27
sea. M.P. Brown sets out in detail the duties 
of the seller in this situation, with 
illustrative cases.
3. The third exception is stated thus: "...the loss 
falls upon the vendor, if the subject perish 
from a vice of such a nature that the vendor 
would have been liable under his obligation of 
warrandice, had the subject perished from the 
same cause after delivery."
4. Agreement by the parties as regards the passing 
of risk ousts the common law rule.
3. WARRANDICE AGAINST FAULTS
1. REDHIBITION
In Scotland at common law the contract of sale implied 
warrandice: if goods were bought for the full market 
price there was implied in the contract a warranty on 
the seller's part that he was delivering goods worthy
39
of the price paid, and fit for the purpose for which
such articles are usually used. This is the concept
of price worthiness. A breach of this warranty
entitled the buyer to return the goods to the seller
and to demand repayment of the price (redhibition).
There are very many decided cases illustrating this
feature of Scots law, holding that the sale of a
commodity at a fair price implied a warranty that the
article was of corresponding quality. For example,
28
Paterson v. Dickson where Lord Justice-Clerk Hope 
stated:
"...when an article is sold at a good 
market price this implies warranty on the 
seller's part that it is of good 
quality...This is an important feature of 
the law of Scotland and one in which it is 
favourably distinguished from that of 
England ...and I see that in a late case in 
the court of Queen's Bench it was regretted 
that no such doctrine obtained in England."
29
Again, the case of Hill v. Pringle involved grass 
seed which failed to grow. Before he sowed the seed 
the buyer noticed that it had a bad colour and smell, 
but he was not certain that it would not germinate. 
It was held "...the seed was bad, although the price 
paid was for good seed...if the fact be so, the 
question of law is one on which there can be no 
doubt...he was entitled to sow on the faith that the
seller would not give him bad seed." In Brown v.
30
Laurie the implied warranty was held to apply even 
in a case where the seller acknowledged a horse to be 
very old, and in consequence sold it for a low price,
40
but the animal was found to be totally useless.
The seller was always liable for latent defects,
whether he was aware of their existence or not: Brown
31
v. Boreland concerned a cow which was suffering
from a latent chronic disease which did not exist in
an ac<j:ute form at the time of sale. It was held to be
"nothing to the purpose in Scots law" that the seller
32
was ignorant of the disease.
If the goods were examined by the purchaser before
the sale, the circumstances might indicate that the
buyer had satisfied himself as to the quality of the
goods as regards visible defects which he ought to 
33
have seen. This follows the Roman law rule that the
seller was not liable unless the alleged defect was
latent at the time of the contract. However, the fact
that the purchaser had examined the goods was by no
means conclusive — "If the fault be latent, although
the buyer should see the commodity, there is, by the
law of Scotland, an implied warranty; the goods might
on discovery of the fault, be rejected; and if the
article perished by such latent fault, the buyer was
relieved from payment, or entitled to have back the 
34
price." Further, mere suspicion was not enough (as 
with the grass seeds in Hill v. Pringle above) 
because the basis of the Scots rule was that the buyer 
was fully entitled to rely on the good faith of the 
seller who had a duty to disclose latent defects known
41
35
to him- This concept of good faith in the Scots law
36
of sale is described by Gow as the "animating
principle of the contract". It is of course in total
contrast to the English animating principle of caveat
37
emptor and in fact MacKintosh has called the Scots 
warrandice of quality the "opposite principle" of 
caveat emptor.
In the situation where the goods were not examinable
the contract was liable to reduction if the purchaser
38
later discovered faults, as in Duthie v- Carnegie , 
which involved a ship at sea. The seller did not 
disclose defects of which he was aware and which 
rendered the vessel unseaworthy.
If the seller was aware of the defect he was liable
for the losses of the buyer as a result of his 
39
fraud.
The implied warrandice could be excluded by the
40
seller declaring the defect to the purchaser. There
was of course no remedy if the purchaser knew of the
41
defect even though it was not visible.
The warrandice could also be excluded by proving 
that the contract had been for sale of the thing "with 
all faults". Then the seller could be found liable 
only for fraud. But even a sale with all faults did 
not excuse a seller who did not deliver goods of the
42
42
description contracted for.
The fault complained of had to be such as to render
the goods unfit for their proper use. There is
authority to the effect that the defect must not be
43
trifling or partial.In Alston v. Orr 0 sold lint 
seed to A who claimed that the seed did not grow, and
being yitiuw latent by the civil law, he was not
liable to pay the price. The Court of Session held 
that the pursuer would have to prove that all those 
people who bought the rest of the parcel of seed had 
also had no crop and that it was not enough to say
that part of the seed "had no increase".
Where the goods were capable of being used for
several purposes the buyer could not rescind the
contract because they were not fit for one particular
use, if they were not bought expressly for that 
44
purpose.
It was not a competent defence for a seller to claim
45
that the defect was curable, nor that it no longer
existed when the action was raised. The test was
whether the defect existed at the time of the 
46
contract.
While in possession of the goods the buyer's duty
was to exercise di1igentia media, and he might find
47
himself barred if he failed in this obligation. The
43
particular circumstances of each case determined the
48
court's decision on this point.
The purchaser was entitled to the use of the goods
until the defect appeared, that is, the court did not
make any deduction from the price to take account of
the buyer's use or possession of the goods; this rule
applied even if the defect resulted in the destruction
of the goods in question. In Fleming v. Airdrie Iron 
49
Co. the contract was for the supply of cast iron
stills to be "first class castings of Scotch iron of
best quality." The sellers knew the use to which
these stills were to be put. After the buyers had
used the stills for six weeks defects appeared which
rendered them useless. It was held that the sellers
had failed to supply stills suitable for the purpose
contracted for and were therefore liable to the
purchasers; machinery supplied for a particular
purpose cannot be tested without a considerable amount 
50 51
of use. In Kinnear v. Brodie a horse warranted
"correct in wind and work" proved so unruly that it
drowned. It was held that it was disconform to
warranty and the purchaser would have been entitled to
return it had it not drowned.
According to the principles of Roman law if the
thing (though defective) had deteriorated or perished
through the buyer's fault, he had to deduct from his
52
claim an amount to allow for this fact. Also taken
44
from Roman law was the rule that if the buyer after
discovering a defect resold the goods without loss he
was not entitled to bring a claim against the 
53
seller.
If the sale comprised a number of things and only
some were defective, the right of action applied only
to the defective objects and not the satisfactory 
54
ones.
As noted in Section I the Roman law actio
redhibitoria prescribed six months from the time of
sale. In Scots law no period was fixed within which
the pursuer had to return the goods and raise the
action - it depended on the circumstances whether
there had been undue delay. According to Stair a
latent defect would only found a successful action if
"...when the insufficiency appeared, the thing bought
be offered to be restored ...after which retention is
accounted an acquiescence in and homologation of the 
55
contract." Erskine states that the actio
redhibitor ia in Scots law is "limited to the special
case where the buyer, in a few days after the goods
have been delivered to him, offers them back to the
seller: for otherwise it is presumed from the buyer's
silence either that he hath passed from all objections
to the sale or that the insufficiency has happened
56
after the goods came into his possession". M.P. 
Brown points out, however, that the relevant point in
45
57
time is when the defect is discovered by the buyer.
The goods, says Brown, must be returned within a
reasonable time after the fault has shown itself; and
Bell states in his Inquiries into the Contract of 
58
Sale "the thing bought must, if it is meant to be
challenged on a warranty, express or implied, be
instantly rejected...that is to say, as soon as the
buyer has a fair opportunity of being aware of the
breach of warranty-" The rule, then, was that when
latent defects came to the knowledge of the buyer his
remedy was to give notice to the seller and within a
59
reasonable time return the goods. In McBey v. 
60
Gardiner the rule was stated in these terms: "as
soon as unsoundness is discovered it is the duty of
the buyer to give notice to the seller and within a
reasonable time tender the Igoodsl back, and if
refused, to have recourse to judicial procedings-" A
horse had been sold with a warranty of soundness on
15th June. On 18th June and 4th July the buyer
intimated by letter to the seller that the horse was
unsound, but thereafter the purchaser kept the horse
in his stable for 57 days and in the circumstances it
was held that his claim for repetition of the price
was barred by his failure to place the horse in
neutral custody and his delay in raising the action.
He should have taken steps to "throw the horse back on
the defender." In the considerably earlier case in
61
1668 of Aiton v. Fairie a horse turned out to be 
much older than had been represented by the seller to
46
the buyer and the court "ordained him to condescend
that very shortly thereafter he offered the horse
62
back, otherwise they would not sustain the process."
63
In Wellwood v. Bray it was a material element of
the case that a diseased horse was offered back within
64
24 hours after the discovery of the illness.
The position as regards an express warranty was that
this added to the implied warranty and in no way
ousted it. This was held in Cooper and Aves v.
65
Clydesdale Shipping Co. where supplies for a ship
were warranted "to pass survey of government
inspectors." This warranty did not exclude the
warranty implied at common law that goods should be
fit for the purpose for which they were sold: “There
is an express warranty that all stores shall pass
survey of government inspectors but that is not the
only warranty under this contract ...it is superadded
to another warranty clearly implied — that the
articles ...should be fit for the special and
66
particular purposes for which they were intended."
The above was the position at common law. In 1855 a
Royal Commission was set up to consider the
assimilation of the laws of Scotland and England on
implied conditions and warranties. The Commission
found :
"If a specific article be sold for a full 
price, and if the fault be so latent as not 
to be observable at the time of the sale,
47
the buyer on discovering the fault may, in 
Scotland, return the article, and is not 
bound to pay the price...There is an implied 
obligation on the seller to warrant that the 
article is of marketable quality...In 
England...there is no such implied 
obligation incumbent on the sellers except
67
in particular circumstances...1
The Commission recommended that the English rule 
should be adopted expressing their opinion that "the 
one rule cannot be said to be more or less just than 
the other" but the Scottish rule tended "to create 
litigations" on the question of whether faults were 
latent or patent, that is to say the buyer had more 
rights in Scotland.
In 1856 the English statutory invasion began with 
the Mercantile Law Amendment Act (Scotland) of that 
year, based on the Royal Commission's findings. As 
explained in the preamble to the Act, "Whereas 
inconvenience is felt by persons engaged in trade by 
reason of the laws of Scotland being in some 
particulars different from those of England and 
Ireland in matters of common occurrence in the course 
of such trade, and with a view to remedy such 
inconvenience it is expedient to amend the law of 
Scotland as hereinafter mentioned."
As has been stated above and will be discussed more 
fully in Section III, the common law of England on 
sale was not based on good faith but on the rule 
caveat e©ptor. It had been established that the law
48
would not infer from the fact of a fair price having
been paid any implied warranty in England. Commercial
interests in Scotland were eager to be rid of the
implied warrandice, and despite disapproval in legal 
68
circles the 1856 Act was passed.The part of the
statute which concerns us in this context is section 5
which provided:
"Where goods shall after the passing of 
this Act be sold the seller, if at the time 
of the sale he was without knowledge that 
the same were defective or of bad quality, 
shall not be held to have warranted their 
quality or sufficiency; but the goods with 
all faults shall be at the risk of the 
purchaser, unless the seller shall have 
given an express warranty of the quality or 
sufficiency of such goods, or unless the 
goods have been expressly sold for a 
specified and particular purpose in which 
case the seller shall be considered without 
such warranty to warrant that the same are 
fit for such purpose"
Two years later Lord President McNeill said
69
"...implied warrandice will not now do." However 
there followed cases in which it looked as though the 
Scottish courts would take a narrow view of the new 
statutory provisions and apply basic Scots principles 
where this proved possible. The interpretation placed 
on the wording of the Act was to the effect that the 
kind of sale envisaged by the Act was one where the 
subject of the contract was specific ascertained 
goods. If the court could find that the contract was 
an emptio imperfecta the Act was excluded (as in Jaffe 
and Hutchison, below).
49
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An important example was Jaffe v. Ritchie where 
yarns were bought as "flax yarns". It was later 
discovered that a number of the spindles contained 
jute. The Sheriff held that before 1856 this sale 
could have been rescinded, but after 1856 an express 
warranty was needed. There was none here, and no
particular purpose was specified by the buyers, and so 
the seller not being guilty of fraud, the pursuers 
must fail. The pursuers appealed. The Inner House 
held that the new Act had no bearing on the case. 
Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis held that when made the 
contract was an emptio imperfecta because the yarn was 
an unascertained part of a larger quantity until 
delivered. The purchaser, he said, was entitled to 
have goods answering to the description of the 
contract and that requirement was never met by the
seller. There was no question of warranty in the
case. It was a case where something sold as pure flax 
yarn turned out not to be so - the seller did not 
supply the goods which he contracted to supply 
therefore the purchaser was entitled to reject the 
goods.
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In Hutchison St Co. v. Henry St Corrie oats were 
described as being for mealing purposes. The 
purchaser claimed that the oats were not in conformity 
with the contract. It was held, following Jaffe, that 
"the object of section 5 was to assimilate the law of 
Scotland to that which had long been the law of
50
England regarding warranty in sales...This case does 
not involve the application of this clause C5D of the 
Statute at all."
In Cooper and Aves v. Clydesdale Shipping Co. 
(above) an agreement to supply stores under an express 
warranty that the goods should pass government 
inspection was held not to exclude the implied 
warranty that the stores should be fit for the purpose 
for which they were purchased.
Where however the effects of the provisions of the
1856 Act could not be avoided they had the desired
dramatic effect on Scots law. If a contract did not
expressly state a particular purpose for which the
goods were intended there was no implied warrandice as
to fitness for purpose.In Hardie v. Austin & 
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McAslan H, a seed merchant, sold "first class 
stocks" of East Lothian swede seeds to A. A carried 
out trial sowings with some of the seeds in which he 
claimed that only 50% were productive — 8% of these
were unsatisfactory plants. H refused to take back 
the seed and raised an action for the price in the 
Sheriff Court. The Sheriff-Substitute and the Sheriff 
found that the seed should have had germinating power 
of 85-90% and said it was impossible to ascertain the 
quality before sowing it. The defender had intimated 
the defect at once - held the pursuer must fail. 
However Lord President Inglis on appeal pointed out
51
that there was no express warranty granted by the 
pursuer or required by the defender. The Sheriff had 
overlooked the 1856 Act according to Section 5 of 
which the risk was with the purchaser. The case he 
said did not fall within the exceptions allowed by 
section 5. He gave examples of specified or particular 
purposes: oats for seed or oats to be ground into 
meal, oil for food or oil for burning. Here it was 
stated the seeds were not sold for a "particular 
purpose expressly specified as distinguished from the 
general purposes for which all turnip seed is sold 
viz. for sowing." Lord Kinloch suggested that both 
Sheriffs and seedsmen should study the new Act!
To take a further outstanding example, in Dunlop v.
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Crawford 31 cows were delivered by D to C when he 
ordered "milk cows" for his dairy farm. No express 
warranty was given. Two of the cows were unfit for 
dairy purposes as their teats were damaged. C 
deducted the cost of these 2 cows from the price. D 
brought an action for the price of the 2 defective 
animals. C argued that all the cows were bought for a 
specified purpose;2 cows were unfit for that purpose. 
The Sheriff held that the defender was justified in 
refusing the 2 cows and in refusing to pay. In the 
Court of Session the pursuer claimed that the case did 
not fall under section 5 - the purpose must not only
be "specified" but must also be "particular". The 
defender stated that having given notice to the
pursuer that these cows were required for dairy 
purposes they were sold for a "specified and 
particular purpose" within the meaning of the Act.They 
might have been for fattening or grazing but a 
particular purpose of dairy work had been specified. 
Lord President Inglis held that section 5 applied — 
the cows after the sale were at the risk of the 
purchaser unless an express warranty could be shown or 
the goods were "expressly sold for a particular 
purpose." The rule was that if goods were bought for 
the purposes for which such goods were ordinarily 
used, the exception did not apply. Here the purpose 
might have been specified, but it was not a particular 
purpose!
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In Robeson v. Waugh the purchaser claimed that
the seller had represented a horse to be sound. The
buyer rejected the horse as unsound the day after the
sale. It was held proved that the horse had been
unsound when sold but it was not proved that the buyer
had warranted it sound or knew of its unsoundness.
Lord President Inglis held (at page 65> that "the
words used would not amount to a warranty under the
fifth section of the Mercantile Law Amendment Act".
The contrast between the judicial attitudes taken in
these cases and in Scottish cases before the 1S56 Act
is most striking, particularly in such a typical
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transaction as the sale of a horse.
2. ACTIO QUANTI MINPRIS?
In Roman law there were the alternative actions 
redhibitor ia or quanti winoris; under the latter the 
buyer kept the goods but claimed against the seller 
for a sum to compensate for the defect (see Section 
I). To what extent this second remedy was adopted by 
Scots law was not clear. The fact that it was never 
fully accepted made sale an exception to the general 
rule in contracts that a minor breach of a contract 
gives rise to a claim for damages, and does not 
justify rescission.
The problem starts with the Institutional writers 
who appear rather divided in their opinions as to the 
availability of the action in Scots law.
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Stair refers to "...our custom, by which only a 
latent insufficiency of the goods and ware, at the 
time of the sale and delivery, is sufficient to abate 
or take down the price."
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Erskine disagrees: of the Roman law he says that 
if a latent fault was slight the buyer had the actio 
quanti minoris to recover "as much of the price as 
exceeded what he might reasonably have given for the
subject had he known the defect- But as no action is 
by our usage competent for setting aside sales on 
account of the disproportion of the price to the value 
of the commodity, it may well be doubted whether the 
buyer would, in consideration of its insufficiency, be 
entitled to the abatement of any part of the price."
78
Bell states "The commodity must be fit for the 
particular purpose specified by the buyer; and if it 
be found on examination it may be rejected and damages 
claimed or, if used before the defect is discovered an 
abatement may be demanded in the price." McLaren, the 
editor of the 1870 edition of the Commentaries, adds a 
note to this "correct this by McCormick v. Rittmeyer" 
(see below).
The safest conclusion that can be reached is to
agree with Irvine in his contribution to the
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Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland - "in Scotland 
at common law the actio quanti ninoris was not wholly 
rejected, but its application was much more restricted 
than in the Roman law".
A.L. Stewart in his article The Actio Quanti 
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Minoris reviews the decided cases which involved the
pleading of the actio (or equivalent pleas); however 
his attempts to formulate some sort of chronological 
pattern from the cases is not particularly convincing, 
and one is left with the impression that the position
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as regards the availability of the remedy was always 
confused at common law. There are judicial opinions
tending in opposite directions. In McCormick v.
81
Rittmeyer Lord President Inglis said:
"When a purchaser •.. finds that the goods 
are not conform to order, his only remedy is 
to reject the goods and rescind the 
contract... The purchaser is not entitled to 
retain the goods and demand an abatement 
from the contract price corresponding to the 
disconformity of the goods to order, for 
this ...would resolve into a claim of the 
nature of the actio quanti minoris which our 
law entirely rejects."
In an equally unambiguous dictum in Louttit's Trs. v.
82
Highland Rwy. Lord McLaren stated:
"There are only two remedies open to a 
purchaser which are known to jurisprudence.
He has a ...right to rescind the contract 
conditional on his rejecting the goods or 
heritable property, and to claim damages 
proportioned to the inconvenience to which 
he has been put by the non fulfilment of the 
contract. His other remedy is the actio 
quanti minor is, the proper application of 
which is to the case of latent 
infirmity...discovered when matters are no 
longer entire. At one time it was doubted 
whether we had this form of action in 
relation to sales of moveable property...
Now however it is quite settled... in such 
cases as ships and fixed machinery which 
cannot be returned after they have been in 
use... the purchaser's remedy takes the 
form of an actio quanti minor is ...the 
purchaser may recover such sum as will 
enable him to put the subject in proper 
repair,or compensate him for loss of 
profit..."
Lord President Robertson, however, was not convinced 
as to the "settled" nature of the law. He thought 
Louttit "a very singular action because it is not... 
of a kind known to the books that a person should
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retain possession of a heritable subject sold to him, 
and at the same time claim damages for the difference 
in value between a clear and restricted title."
In his article Stewart deals separately with 
moveables and heritage, treating separately McCormick 
and Louttit (the latter concerned heritage), but in 
the period before 1893 this was not a meaningful 
distinction in Scots law in the context of warrandice 
against faults and for the purposes of this discussion 
there is no reason to separate the two.
As to the other authorities in this field, M.P.
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Brown is unequivocal "...we have rejected the actio
quanti minor is, as being inconsistent with the true
principles of the contract and hurtful to the
interests of commerce." He cites Stair and Erskine
(see above). His only other reference in this context
84
is to a case in 1771, Lindsay v. Wilson in which 
the actio quanti minoris was not referred to at all. 
(The case concerned 2 horses which were lame at the 
time of sale and it was held that this should have 
been seen to be so "by any person who had viewed them 
with ordinary attention.")
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R. Brown states that the action was not recognised 
except in "special circumstances" and refers to Moyle 
and Mackintosh (see below). He goes on to say that 
the actio was not absolutely rejected. He quotes Lord
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McLaren in Louttit (above) and refers to Bell's 
86
Commentaries but interestingly cites no other cases 
in this context-
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Moyle says that in Scots law "the Roman rule has 
disappeared" (he does not attempt to show that it ever 
appeared).
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Mackintosh's view is that the actio was rejected
89
by Scots law in general , an exception being made 
where fraud was proved, when the goods might be 
retained and an abatement in the price claimed.
Some of the confusion has arisen because the courts 
(while sometimes declaring that the actio was not 
available, sometimes not referring to it at all) 
provided a remedy in the form of damages where this 
seemed equitable, especially where fraud was a factor 
(or was suspected). Examples are:
90
Bald v. Scott where Lord Justice-Clerk Hope said 
"I quite admit...that the actio quanti minoris has 
found no favour in our law. But an entire reduction 
of the transaction is now impossible." Damages were 
awarded.
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In Gray v. Hamilton "the court were a good deal 
divided". This involved an estate which turned out to 
be smaller than had been bargained for (77 not 94
58
acres). It was held "no fraud is here alleged, and 
therefore the purchaser must take his option either to 
abandon the purchase altogether, or to be contented 
with what he had got." There is in this case an
indication of the desire of the Scottish judges to 
provide a remedy in such cases, even though they 
sometimes thought none existed: "Find there is no
ground in this case for any deduction from the price, 
and in so far adhere to the interlocutor of the Lord 
Ordinary reclaimed against; but remit to his Lordship 
to hear parties, how far any circumstances occur in 
this case that may afford any other ground for the 
petitioner's claim of relief, and to determine therein 
as to his Lordship shall seem just."
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In Paton v. Lockhart an action for abatement of a 
purchase price was entertained by the court.
93
In Adamson v. Smith damages were awarded in a 
case where rye grass seed turned out to be annual when 
it had been claimed by the seller to be not annual 
seed.
In some other cases (fewer in number) it seems that
the court acknowledged in a more positive way the
existence of the actio. In Seaton v. Carmichael and 
94
Findlay it was argued "...by the civil law and our 
custom, if the insufficiency appear before acception 
of the ware, the bargain may be annulled actione
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redhibitoria, and if the insufficiency appear 
thereafter, the price must be abated according to the 
damage and reduced to that rate such ware would have 
given, if the latent insufficiency had been known, 
actio quanti minoris." A proof was allowed.
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Similarly in Wilson v. Campbell's Creditors an 
action was entertained where the pursuer based his 
claim specifically on the actio quanti minoris of the 
civil law.
The Scottish courts in any event always provided a
remedy when bad faith was involved in inducing
9 h
contracts of sale. In Stewart v. Jamieson it was 
stated "The liability of a seller who knows of defects 
in what he sells...Cisl a liability not upon warranty 
but upon fraud."
As stated above M.P. Brown is totally dismissive of
the actio quanti minor is. However in another
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context he sets out the following rule: if the
seller did not know of the existence of the defect he 
was liable only to repay the price, not for damages. 
An exception was made, he says, in the case of sellers
in the coJse of trade — in this situation the vendor
A
was liable in damages for loss caused to the buyer by
faults in the goods, whether or not he knew of them.
This exception was based on the reasoning that a 
tradesman by holding himself out as a person of skill
60
in a particular trade, renders himself responsible to
those who rely on his skill or judgement (to use the
British statutory phrase). This liability arose only
when the buyer had used the thing in question for its
ordinary use - the tradesman warranted it only for its 
98
"proper use". (Also there was no remedy if the
purchaser knew of the defect although it was not 
visible.)It seems that in Scots law the liability of 
the seller was taken further than these basic civilian 
principles, at least in some cases, and even the 
innocent seller of defective goods could be held
liable in damages when he was ignorant of the defect.
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In Dickson & Co. v. Kincaid, Kincaid, a farmer sold 
Swedish turnip seeds to Dicksons, seed merchants; they 
sold the seeds on to various customers. When the
seeds were sown, they produced a "spurious or bastard
variety" of turnips, not Swedish turnips. Dicksons 
were successfully sued by one of their customers, and 
they then raised an action against Kincaid, claiming 
damages for the loss to their reputation which they 
had sustained through selling imperfect goods. It
emerged that what had happened was that Kincaid had 
planted Swedish turnip seeds beside other vegetables 
the pollen of which, when they flowered, were carried 
to the turnips, giving rise to a mixed species of 
turnip. Kincaid had sold the seed in good faith, he 
was not a dealer in seeds who was expected to have 
professional skill. (The court may have felt however 
that as a farmer he could reasonably have been
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expected to be aware of the possibility of cross 
pollination, but this is not indicated in the report. 
The defender described himself as "an ignorant rustic" 
and claimed that only a botanist could have foreseen 
what happened.) It was held that both under the 
implied warrandice of sale and the express warrandice 
that the seeds were good Swedish seed the defender was 
liable in damages. It was held to be of no 
consequence that the defect arose from accidental 
impregnation by other plants. A sum was allowed 
"...as a solatium for the loss of character which they 
CDicksonsl risk among their customers." However the 
reasoning in this case would appear to depend on a 
delictual duty owed, rather than on the concept of 
abatement of the price proportionate to the extent of 
any defect. McLaren in his notes on Bell's 
Commentaries refers to Adamson v. Smith (see above) 
and mentions Dickson v. Kincaid, calling it "a 
curious case of the same sort."
What was available appears to have been a 
combination of the actio redhibitoria and the actio 
quanti minoris. This is indicated in the quotation 
from Lord McLaren's opinion in Louttit (above). 
Damages were awarded where the judges considered it 
equitable, or where restitution of the property was no 
longer possible. Why the actio quanti minoris was 
denied so frequently and was thought of as not forming 
a part of the Scottish law of sale is something of a
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mystery.
The fact that the cases are contradictory and that 
there are few where the actio was specifically founded 
on, indicates that the actio quanti ainoris was never 
fully accepted in Scots law. It was very much part of 
English law (see Section III) and so the Sale of Goods 
Act 1893 provided a new remedy for Scotland (see 
Section IV).
4. WARRANDICE AGAINST EVICTION
Following the Roman rule, the seller was not bound to
give title as owner, but to guarantee the purchaser
undisturbed possession of the thing sold. "...in sale
delivery of the goods or things bought, with the
obligation of warrandice in case of eviction, which is
implied in sale, though not expressed, is the
implement of it on the seller's part, and even though
the buyer know, and make it appear, that it were not
the seller's, yet he could demand no more but delivery
100
and warrandice."
The position was that the seller was bound after 
delivery to warrant the buyer against the possibility 
of someone with a better title than the seller's
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claiming the article in question. As is clear from
the above quotation from Stair, the purchaser was not
justified in making any objection on the ground that
the title was bad - he had no claim for damages as
long as he remained in undisputed possession:
"Ownership in common moveables being presumed from
possession, no objection is pleadable to suspend the
bargain on mere suspicion or probability of a
101
challenge of the ownership."
In the event of someone with a good title to the 
goods claiming them from the purchaser, the latter was 
said to be "evicted." In the strictest interpretation 
of the word, eviction could only take place when 
someone was deprived of the article in question by 
order of a court; however in looser usage in Scots and 
Roman law it is used to denote the situation that 
exists when someone other than the buyer of goods sold 
has a pre-existing right to them. There was nothing 
in Scots law to correspond to the stipulatio duplae of 
Roman law (see Section I).
The warrandice against eviction was implied by law 
and did not need to be alluded to in the contract. 
(Historically, as now, an express "warrandice clause" 
was always used in dispositions of heritage). The 
implied warrandice was absolute - lesser degrees of 
undertaking could be agreed by the parties (see 
below). The implied warrandice covered all evictions
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"...of which the cause or the germ existed at the time 
102
of the sale." This warrandice existed whether the
seller knew of the flaw in his title or not. The
obverse of the rule applied, that is, no warrandice
was incurred when the cause of eviction began after
sale unless it "proceeds from the act of the vendor 
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himself." The rule applied even if warrandice was
excluded in the contract "because no agreement can
104
protect a man against his own fraud." The
warrandice did not operate when eviction was due to
105
the buyer's own fault as in Shaw v. Durham where
it was held that no relief was due from the seller as
106
"the distress was from the parties' own deed." Nor
was it applicable if the distress was due to
107
supervening law.
The purchaser was justified in handing over the
disputed goods and then raising an action against his
seller, if he could show that the third party had a
good title to the goods: "...where a clear right
appears in the evictor, and the only consequence of
resistance would be to accumulate expense, the buyer
will be entitled to abandon the thing, and to insist
1 0 8
on the seller's warranty." In Melvil v. Fairin in 
109
1662 the purchaser discovered that the lands he had 
bought were burdened, it was held "the distress by the 
stipend was unquestionable; payment made thereof 
without process prejudged not."
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If the property was -found to be burdened (e.g. with
bonds), the buyer was entitled to relief from the
seller. "A party cannot be said to have received
delivery and possession of a subject which may be
taken from him in whole or in part by the holders of
110
real rights affecting it." It seems that if the
burden discovered was only a servitude, the implied
111
warrandice would not protect the buyer.
When possession of only a proportion of the property
was lost the seller was liable to the buyer up to the
112
amount of his loss. Under the warrandice the buyer,
when faced with threatened eviction, was entitled to
call on the seller to defend his right. However it
appears that intimation to him was not essential to
secure the liability of the seller; the pursuer could
proceed with his action and the seller would be liable
unless he could show that the purchaser had failed to
113
plead a relevant defence. The purchaser could not
compel the vendor to proceed with a hopeless case, and
if a third party's right was manifestly better than
the seller's, he could opt to pay the purchaser
compensation. In a case where the seller refused to
proceed on this ground and offered compensation the
buyer could still proceed against the threatened
eviction himself, but if defeated he could not claim
his expenses from the seller; he was entitled to the
114
price and damages equivalent to his losses.
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In the event of eviction the Roman rale applied as
to the extent of the seller's liability. The
purchaser was entitled to claim an amount to cover all
his losses as a result of the eviction: "It is
incontested that absolute warrandice, after the
subject is evicted, founds the grantee in an action of
recourse against the granter, for making up to him the
full damage he has suffered, either through the
contravention of the warrandice, or any defect in the 
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right." The extent of damages therefore depended on
the circumstances. The seller always had to repay the
price which the buyer had paid. He was also obliged
to pay expenses incurred by the purchaser in defending
his right, plus damages, normally for "such loss as it
can be presumed that the parties contemplated at the
time of the contract, as likely to arise from the
116
non-delivery of the thing sold." For this purpose
eviction was equivalent to failure to deliver the 
117
goods. "In all obligations concerning things
lawful...the obligant who fails in the performance of
his part, must make up to the creditor the damage he
has sustained through the non-performance...No damage
which is remote or indirect ought to enter into the
118
computation." Some rules were specific to the
situation where eviction had taken place: if the
subject of the contract had increased in value since
the date of the sale, the buyer could claim the value
119
at the time he lost possession.
There were detailed rules regarding the buyer's
claim against the real owner where he had made
improvements to his purchase, and also against the
vendor where he failed to recover from the true 
120
owner.
The parties could of course restrict the absolute
warrandice which the law implied to what M.P. Brown 
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calls a "lower species of warrandice." Brown tells
us that often the seller did not wish to warrant the
thing absolutely and bound himself in warrandice from
fact and deed only — thus he undertook merely that he
would do nothing inconsistent with the purchaser's
122
right. If this were done the buyer was taken as
accepting the goods with any defects in title - he was
protected only against eviction caused by the seller's
own act or omission. If eviction happened without the
vendor breaching his limited warrandice, the purchaser
had no right to reclaim even the price. A clear
123
example is Craig v. Hopkin in 1732 where it was
stated "...when one sells with warrandice from fact
and deed, the intention is not to sell the subject
absolutely, ...but only to sell it so as the seller
himself has it, that is, to sell what title and
interest he has in the subject, the purchaser taking
upon himself all other hazards." Warrandice from fact
and deed extended to the past as well as the future
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deeds of the vendor and his successors.
From early times in Scots law "warrandice lands"
were commonly conveyed in security in addition to the
land actually being sold. "The purchaser who has this
security, may have recourse to the warrandice lands in
the event that the principal lands are evicted or
125
carried of from him..."
The foregoing remained the law as regards moveables,
but it became settled that in sales of heritage a good
title had to be given before the price was paid.
Except in sales of heritage, therefore, it was not
accurate to say that there was an implied warranty of
title. Surprisingly Bell does this in his Inquiries
126
into the Contract of Sale and also in some parts of
the Principles,(for example "...there is an implied
warranty that the seller has a good title enabling him 
127 128
to sell") but not others. Mackintosh also writes
129
of an implied warranty of title; but neither Bell
nor Mackintosh seem consciously to intend to extend
the concept of warrandice against eviction to
130
moveables, as R. Brown suggests that Bell is doing.
As regards heritage, there are early cases which
make the position clear, holding that defects in title
meant that the purchaser was not obliged to proceed
131
with the bargain, as in Little v. Dickson in 1749. 
This concerned a tenement building in Peebles with a 
defective progress — "found the progress not 
sufficient, and therefore found Cthe buyer! not bound
69
132
to the bargain."
M.P. Brown makes it clear that there was a 
distinction between heritage and moveables:
"...there can be no doubt, that in our law 
there is room for a distinction between the 
sale of heritage and the sale of moveables. 
Heritable property cannot be held without a 
written title; neither can it be transferred 
without writing. It is always in the power 
of a party to ascertain and to show whether 
he is truly proprietor of a heritable 
subject, so as to be able to transfer the 
property to another. But as the property of 
moveables is presumed from the possession, 
and as it is not customary to use writing in 
the transference of them by sale, it must 
often be impassible far a party to show by 
direct evidence that he is proprietor of a
133
moveable subject..."
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Swan v. Martin shows that up to the time of the 
Sale of Goods Act this difference existed, and that 
before the Act warrandice in sale of moveables was 
only against eviction. The pursuer bought 
shop-fittings and raised this action for repetition of 
part of the price on the ground that certain of the 
articles sold did not belong to the seller. The 
Sheriff-substitute found that as regards the items in 
dispute the sale was "ultra vires of the defender, and 
that the property has not been passed by said 
pretended sale." The Sheriff agreed. However Lord 
Justice-Clerk Inglis found that the Sheriff-substitute 
and Sheriff had been "entirely wrong." Swan had 
bought the stock-in-trade of a business and paid for 
all the items on an inventory. It now appeared that
70
as regards some of these items, questions might be 
raised as to whether they belonged to the landlord of 
the premises where the fittings were situated. The 
Lord Justice-Clerk said that the court had no concern 
with these questions because the items had not been 
evicted from the pursuer. “He raises this action 
without any statement of eviction or distress, and in 
these circumstances the action cannot lie."
In many fundamental ways the principles discussed in 
this Section were altered in 1893. In Section IV the 
changes made will be examined.
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SECTION III - ENBLISH LAW UP TO 1893
In the period immediately preceding 1893 in England,
the law in several important aspects was characterised
by conflicting judicial decisions and arbitrary
classifications. It was from this rather confused
state of affairs that Chalmers derived the 1893 Act.
Addressing the American Bar Association in 1902 he
said: "When the principles of the law are well
settled, and when the decided cases that accumulate
are in the main mere illustrations of accepted general
1
rules, then the law is ripe for codification." No 
doubt the English law on sale required clarification, 
but it was certainly not "ripe for codification" if 
Chalmers' criteria are used.
The S.G.A. was drafted in 1888 and represented 
Chalmers' attempt to codify the English case law on 
the subject as it then stood. In 1890 he published 
"The Sale of Goods" (hereinafter referred to as the 
1890 edition), a commentary on the Bill showing whence 
he derived its clauses. At that stage the Bill did 
not extend to Scotland. In 1894 Chalmers published the 
first edition of "The Sale of Goods Act" (hereinafter 
referred to as the 1894 edition) now in its 18th 
edition. The history of the Bill is described in the
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introduction to the 1894 edition. Chalmers' efforts
have been severely criticised over the years, but the
Act has also been hailed (less understandably) as
being an outstanding work of draftsmanship for its 
2
time. Indeed it remained completely unchanged until 
1954 and its provisions were adopted with little 
modification throughout the Commonwealth; in the 
U.S.A. the Uniform Sales Act was based on it. Despite 
Chalmers' avowed intention of codifying the existing 
law there is no doubt that the S.B.A. contained 
innovations (it must be said, however, that this was 
inevitable because of the uncertain state of the
decided cases in some areas). Stoljar makes a very 
damning assessment: "...the draftsman merely
perpetuated several unnecessary distinctions and,
furthermore, added many difficulties of construction
3
of his own."
The main features of English law before the Act will 
be briefly outlined in this section (under headings
which correspond with those used for Scots law in
Section II) as follows:
1. Passing of property
2. Passing of risk
3. Conditions and Warranties
1. General
2. Warranty of quality
3. Remedies for breach of warranty
4. Warranty of title
1. PASSING OF PROPERTY
In English law the term "property" is used in a less
readily definable manner than in Scots law, as it has
two possible connotations; in the context of sale of
goods what is meant by passing of property is "a
transfer of the absolute or general property in a
4
thing for a price in money." "General property" must
be distinguished from "special property". This
distinction is sometimes made by referring to general
property as "the" property in goods, while special
5
property is seen as "a" property. A special property
in goods may be in one person while the general
property or dominium is in another. The most obvious
example of a special property is pledge where the
6
pledgee has only a special property in the goods.
There is of course no such distinction to be made in
Scots law.
Passing of property was not an area of the law of
sale of goods where confusion existed, and the rubric
7
at the head of Chapter III of Blackburn's Treatise 
sums up the positions "The effect of a bargain and 
sale is to transfer the property in the goods without 
any delivery; in this respect English law differs from 
the Civil law."
The distinction must be made between bargain and
sale and executory agreements "...the distinction
between the two contracts consists in this, that in a
bargain and sale, the thing which is the subject of
the contract becomes the property of the buyer, the
moment the contract is concluded, and without regard
to the fact whether the goods be delivered to the
buyer or remain in possession of the vendor, whereas
in the executory agreement, the goods remain the
property of the vendor till the contract is
8
executed." In a bargain and sale the parties must 
be agreed as to the goods involved; until they are so 
agreed, the contract is one to supply goods of a
particular description, an executory agreement. This 
rule goes back to the oldest English law books - no 
property passes to the purchaser until a particular 
portion of some larger quantity is identified and
severed. What must be identifiable is what Lord
80
9
Ellenborough called in Busk v. Davis "the
individuality of the thing to be delivered." This
case involved the sale of ten tons of flax lying at a
certain wharf. The sellers owned more than ten tons 
of flax at the wharf, and nothing was done to separate 
or weigh ten tons from the rest. When the buyer 
became insolvent the seller countermanded the order 
and it was held that the property had not passed — it 
was impossible for the buyer to say that any precise
portion of the whole was his: something had to be done 
to establish the "individuality" of the goods in 
question.
So the property could pass by the contract itself if
10
that was the intention of the parties. It was
established law that the passing of property was not
11
conditional on payment of the price. The distinction
between the English and Scottish traditions in this
respect emerges very clearly in the case of Seath v. 
12
Moore. This case concerned a ship which was to be
paid for by instalments as certain stages were reached
in its construction. Quite different conclusions as
to who owned the vessel would be reached by applying
the different rules of Scots and English law. Lord 
13
Blackburn stated that in English law a contract for 
valuable consideration is effectual to change the 
property, while in Scots law, as we have seen, the 
property does not pass without delivery, actual or 
constructive.
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In general when the goods were specific, property
was deemed to have passed on conclusion of the
agreement. In the much quoted words of Parke, J. in
14
Dixon v. Yates:
"I take it to be clear that by the law of 
England the sale of a specific chattel 
passes the property in it to the vendee 
without delivery ... Where, by the contract 
itself, the vendor appropriates to the 
vendee a specific chattel and the latter 
thereby agrees to take that specific chattel 
and to pay the stipulated price, the parties 
are then in the same situation as they would 
be after a delivery of goods ... The effect 
of the contract, therefore, is to vest the 
property in the bargainee.”
In theory the property passed when the parties
intended it to pass. The courts developed rules for
application when no intention was apparent from the 
15
contract. The presumption was, in general, that
where no intention was evident, the contract was
bargain and sale if the subject of the contract was a
specific thing ready for immediate delivery "...there
is no reason for imputing to the parties any intention
to suspend the transfer of the property, in as much as
the thing and the price have been mutually assented to
16
and nothing remains to be done." This presumption
could be rebutted by the circumstances of a particular
transaction (e.g. sale in a shop where goods and money
were taken to be exchanged simultaneously) or by 
17
agreement.
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If the goods were not specific or if something
required to be done to put them into a deliverable
state, or if the intention of parties was clear that
property was not to pass, then the contract merely
operated in the first instance to create personal
obligations. Once the goods were made specific (or
whatever might be required in the particular case) the
IB
contract operated as a conveyance.
2. PASSING OF RISK
The general rule in England as to passing of risk was
that when property passed, risk of loss also passed,
that is, risk remained with the person in whom
property resided: "...the risk of the loss is prima
19
facie in the person in whom the property is." That
is to say that the maxim res per it domino applied to
20
sales in English law and the question of whether or
not property had passed was therefore of relevance
where goods were lost, damaged etc. Property and risk
go so closely together that if you can "... show that
the risk attached to one person or the other, it is a
very strong argument for showing that the property was
21
meant to be in him."
As noted in Section II the rule was otherwise in
83
Scotland, where the Roman rule making sale an
exception to the "res perit" principle was -followed.
Despite this basic difference in the theory of the two
systems the practical effect was the same: in England
the property passing on conclusion of the contract and
the risk with it, in Scotland the risk alone passing
when the contract was perfect. Moyle states "The
English law as to the question at whose risk the goods
are is in substance much the same as the Civil Law,
but the principle is different. In respect of
sales... we follow the maxim res perit domino and
whether the goods are at the risk of the purchaser
depends on whether... the property in them has passed 
22 23
to him." M.P.Brown makes the same point, giving
the example of goods which have been sold and then
perished while still in the possession of the seller,
he shows that the practical effect was the same in
both jurisdictions, but for different reasons. 
24
Chalmers makes the same point: "Thus by different
routes English and Scotch law arrive at practically
the same results." But the fact that the practical
result of different principles was sometimes the same,
was not regarded by M.P.Brown as lessening the
importance of distinctions between the two systems:
"...it makes it still more desirable that the true
nature and extent of these distinctions should be well
understood, in order that we may not be led into
error, in reasoning from the analogy of the English
25
cases, or in citing them as authorities."
In a sale of a specific chattel conditionally,
property and risk remained with the vendor till the
26
condition was satisfied.
3. CONDITIONS AND WARRANTIES
1. GENERAL
In English law the terms "conditions" and "warranties"
have been the subject of much confusion resulting in a
27
variety of analyses, classifications and divisions.
The standard English text books on contract law
discuss the problem fully, indeed Chalmers states that
Anson described six different senses in which the term
28
warranty was used in decided cases. A discussion on
the merits of these various theories is not one of the
aims of this paper, and in any case the position in
English law was made relatively clear for the purpose
of sale of goods by the 1893 Act (S.11 (1) <b)>.
29
D.M.Walker gives clear modern definitions of the two
30
terms. His definition of "condition" runs as 
follows: "The term condition is ...used, particularly 
in the context of sale of goods in English law, as 
meaning a stipulation as to some important matter, the
85
breach of which gives rise to a right to treat the 
contract as repudiated, as contrasted with a warranty 
which is a stipulation, the breach of which gives rise 
to a claim for damages, but not to a right to treat 
the contract as repudiated." "Warranty" is "...a term 
collateral to the main purpose of the contract, breach 
of which justifies a claim in damages but does not 
justify treating the contract as repudiated."
2. WARRANTY DF QUALITY
The common law of England as regards warranty of
quality demonstrated the operation of the opposite
principle to that which obtained in Scotland: "...no
warranty as to the quality of a chattel is implied
from the mere fact of sale. The rule in such cases is
caveat emptor by which is meant that when the buyer
has required no warranty he takes the risk of quality
on himself, and has no remedy if he chose to rely on
the bare representation of the vendor, unless indeed
31
he can show that representation to be fraudulent."
In the period immediately before the 1893 Act the main 
principles of implied warranty stated in very general 
terms could be said to be: in sales by description
there was a condition that the goods should correspond
32
with the description ; there was also a warranty as
33
to merchantability These two concepts were often
amalgamated, but as regards sale of specific goods
neither rule applied. However these deviations from
the principle of caveat emptor were slow to develop
from the old English common law which embodied few
rules in regard to sale, other than the basic rights
of the seller to the price and the buyer to the
goods. The rule of caveat e»ptor, Chalmers tells 
34
us, owed its position in English law to the fact 
that in early times nearly all sales took place in 
open market - this, however, could probably be said of 
any developing commercial system.
By the time that Benjamin was writing his first 
edition (1868) it was well established that an express 
warranty could be created without the use of any 
special form of words. This had not always been the 
case — if the buyer had doubts as to the quality of 
the goods, the onus was on him to extract an express 
warranty from the seller, and in the early law the
actual words "warrant" or "warranty" required to be
35
used. This over— strict attitude was relaxed in the
36
eighteenth century and a statement of fact might be 
held to be a warranty if it could be shown that such 
was the intention of the parties.
An important point of difference between the English 
and Scottish systems as regards warranty was that even 
where a warranty was express, or could be implied, in
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England it was not held to be one of the essential
elements of the contract, but was regarded as a
collateral undertaking- That this was the case was 
especially evident in judicial utterances when the 
statement or representation in question could be held 
to have been made before the contract, and could
therefore be seen as forming no part of the contract
37
at all.
The seller's liability in the early law was not in
contract but was based on the concept of tort for
deceit for making a false statement. Warranties
developed as something separate from the bargain
because the rule of caveat emptor meant that the buyer
needed to have a separate warranty if he was to be
protected. (This situation contributed to the
development of the distinction in English law between
sale of specific goods and sale by description, which
had such a profound influence on the case law and the
SGA.) Most of the early cases therefore were concerned
with allegations of fraud i.e. breaches of express
warranties. However gradually the courts began to
acknowledge in contracts of sale claims by way of an
38
action in assumpsit and in 1778 this trend was
extended to breach of warranty in the celebrated case
39
of Stuart v. Wilkins. Eventually assumpsit became 
the normal basis of an action in place of deceit in 
cases of non-fraudulent breach of warranty and the way 
was left open (to some extent) for the development of
implied warranty in certain circumstances- This 
concept, however, was not readily accepted by the 
English Courts.
First to emerge, with a struggle, was the implied
condition that goods should correspond with
description and sample if the goods were
unascertained. In the nineteenth century the courts
developed the theory that sale by description was a
special kind of sale. At the same time the courts
were also involved in the development of the concepts
of fitness for purpose and merchantableness; these
became hopelessly entangled with the idea of
correspondence with description, so that it is not
possible to categorise the cases (not only because
these concepts were confused with each other, but
because most of the cases were decided on the basis of
a combination of these tests). What can be seen is
that the courts were hesitatingly moving away from
caveat emptor as the guiding principle in the majority
(but not all) of the leading cases in the latter half
of the nineteenth century. As noted above there was
no exception to the rule of caveat emptor where the
subject of the contract was a specific chattel already
40
existing which the buyer had seen. The various 
deviations from caveat emptor were developed in other 
situations and the rules which Chalmers was trying to 
incorporate in the 1893 Act can be seen emerging in 
the cases.
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One of the earliest of the cases to show this new
41
approach was Gardiner v. Gray in 1815: Lord
Ellenborough said:
"Where there is no opportunity to inspect 
the commodity, the maxim of cai/eat emptor 
does not apply. CThe purchaser! cannot, 
without a warranty, insist that Cthe 
article! shall be of any particular quality 
or fineness, but the intention of both 
parties must be taken to be that it shall be 
saleable in the market under the 
denomination mentioned in the contract... The 
purchaser cannot be supposed to buy goods to 
lay them on a dunghill"
In 1829 in the much cited leading case of Jones v.
42
Bright it was held that the sale of copper 
manufactured and sold by the defendant for the purpose 
of sheathing the bottom of a ship, which lasted only 
four months instead of four years entitled the 
plaintiff to damages. The invoice described the 
article as "Copper for the ship Isabella" and the 
plaintiff paid the market price for copper of the best 
quality. It was established that the decay was caused 
by an intrinsic defect in the quality of the copper. 
It was nevertheless argued for the defendant that 
without express warranty or proof of fraud the seller 
had no responsibility for the quality of the article 
sold. The plaintiff argued that when an article was 
sold for a particular purpose a warranty was implied 
that it should be fit for that purpose. It was held 
that the copper was not fit for the purpose for which 
it was sold and that the law would "protect purchasers
who are necessarily ignorant of the commodity sold" 
(per Best, C.J.). Parke, J. said "... there is an 
implied warranty from the nature of the dealings 
between the parties."
43
Shepherd v. Pybus in 1842 appeared to extend the 
rights of the buyers a warranty of quality was implied 
in a sale of a specific barge which the buyer had 
inspected. The warranty was implied because the buyer 
had not been able to exercise his own judgement - he 
had inspected the vessel after it was built but not 
during its construction and was therefore unable to 
detect faults which rendered the barge unfit for 
normal use.
44
In the celebrated case of Jones v. Just in 1868
it was unequivocally held that the doctrine of caveat
emptor did not apply where the buyer had no
opportunity of inspecting the goods and that there was
an implied warranty to supply goods in a merchantable
condition. The purchaser was entitled to damages
equivalent to the difference between what the hemp in
question was worth when it arrived and what it should
have fetched had it been supplied in the state in
which it ought to have been shipped. (Even as late as
1868 it was argued for the seller in this case that in
the absence of fraud on the seller's part caveat
45
emptor should apply.)
By the time of his first edition in 1868 Benjamin
was able to state under the heading "Implied Warranty 
46
of Quality" "...where a chattel is to be made or 
supplied to the order of the purchaser there is an 
implied warranty that it is reasonably fit for the 
purpose for which it is ordinarily used, or that it is 
fit for the special purpose intended by the buyer, if 
that purpose be communicated to the vendor when the 
order is given."
Benjamin cites a progression of cases in the mid and
47
late nineteenth century where sometimes there was
held to be an implied warranty and sometimes caveat
emptor triumphed. These cases turned on various
technical points - was the seller a dealer in the
commodity in question? Did the purchaser rely on the
seller's judgement or his own? Were the goods "open
to the vendee's inspection"? What was the condition
of the goods when they left the vendor's possession,
for in the absence of express stipulation he was not
liable for deterioration resulting from their
transportion. It would seem that the main point to
emerge to the modern reader from Benjamin's review of
the cases is that if it was at all possible for the
court to hold that the buyer had bought a specific
ascertained chattel, relying on his own judgement,
such would be the decision; there was clearly no
general rule to the effect that caveat emptor was no
48 49
longer to apply. Moyle writing in 1892 attempts to
order the confusion and sets out in numbered
paragraphs the situations in which cai/eat emptor was
limited in English practice
The courts were by no means totally committed to the 
new lines of reasoning and Benjamin tells us that
"severe application" of caveat emptor could still be 
found in the cases. Two outstanding examples of the 
truth of this statement are Barr v. Gibson and 
Chanter v. Hopkins, both of which were decided in
1838. Although decided before several of the leading 
cases which extended the buyer's rights, the cases of
Barr and Chanter were not regarded as having been in
any sense overruled in a situation where every case 
had its own distinguishing features. No general 
principle of law underlay the movement away from 
caveat emptor and therefore many of the cases stood on 
their own, so to speak.
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Barr v. Gibson concerned the purchase of a ship 
which at the time of the contract was believed to be 
at sea, but which had unknown to both parties to the 
transaction gone aground eight days before the sale, 
and was practically a total wreck. The value of the
ship fell from '4,200 to '10 and the jury found that
the ship was really no more than a bundle of timber. 
It was nevertheless held that because the ship was a 
specific and ascertained thing there was no warranty 
of quality. Parke, B. said "In the bargain and sale
of an existing chattel the law does not ...imply any 
warranty of the good quality or condition of the 
chattel sold. The simple bargain and sale, therefore, 
of the ship does not imply a contract that it is then 
seaworthy, or in a serviceable condition... The 
contract is for the sale of the subject absolutely, 
and not with reference to collateral circumstances."
Mellor, J. in the later case of Jones v. Just 
(above) where he reviews previous decisions on sale 
and classifies them, deals with Barr v. Gibson thus: 
"Where there is a sale of a definite existing chattel 
specifically described, the actual condition of which 
is capable of being ascertained by either party there 
is no implied warranty." This comment is not at all 
helpful as it confuses the two concepts which most of 
the cases were trying to distinguish: on the one hand 
an ascertained specific thing and on the other goods 
sold by description only. Also the concept of the 
condition of the goods as being "capable of being 
ascertained" is not of course really the rationale 
behind cases like Shepherd v. Pybus and Jones v. 
Bright (above) where the idea of protecting the 
innocent buyer was emerging.
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In Chanter v. Hopkins the buyer ordered a "smoke 
consuming furnace" to be fitted in his brewery. He 
stated exactly what he required but the furnace with 
which he was supplied by the seller proved to be
unsuitable. It Mas held that there was no implied 
warranty that the furnace should be fit for the 
purpose of a brewery despite earlier decisions to the 
effect that a warranty would be implied where the 
buyer had had no opportunity to examine the goods, and 
that goods should be fit for a particular purpose if 
sold for that purpose (e.g. Best, C.J. in Jones v. 
Bright, see above).
Mellor, J. in Jones v. Just (see above) classifies
Chanter v. Hopkins in the following manners "Where a
known, described, and defined article is ordered of a
manufacturer, although it is stated to be required by
the purchaser for a particular purpose, still, if the
known, defined, and described thing be actually
supplied, there is no warranty that it shall answer
52
the particular purpose intended by the buyer." It is 
submitted that this statement can have no "common 
sense" practical application in the context of sale of 
goods. Mellor, J. felt compelled to incorporate into 
his classification the important cases of Barr and 
Chanter, and incorporate them he did.
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Stoljar argues that in Barr and Chanter the courts 
misconstrued earlier cases like Gardiner v. Gray and 
Jones v. Bright. He maintains that these latter cases 
introduced a new concept into English law which was 
confirmed and extended in Shepherd v. Pybus. Stoljar 
attempts to show that Barr and Chanter are
95
inconsistent with what he calls the "essential
pattern" of 19th century law of sale. However it
might appear that there was no "essential pattern",
that each case was being treated on the basis of its
own particular circumstances and that the courts found
it very difficult to shrug off the doctrine of caveat
emptor. Indeed the "essential pattern" which the
courts were supposed to be developing cannot have
revealed itself very clearly at the time in question,
for both Barr and Chanter were followed by the courts
54
(see e.g. Emmerton v. Matthews ), cited by the
55
authoritative text writers (e.g. Benjamin ) and
56
became part of the S.G.A.
Barr v. Gibson certainly made a significant
contribution to the confused state of the law as at
1893. It does not seem that this confusion was
perceived at the time or there would have been no
question of attempting to codify the law as it stood.
Chalmers' notes on the Act make it clear that the law
was regarded as having made some moves away from
caveat emptor where this was appropriate: "... the
distinct tendency in modern cases is to limit its 
57
scope." However, in the context of what the law had 
been before warranties began to be implied, Barr and 
Chanter obviously were not regarded as glaring 
examples of inconsistency.
As regards latent defects in goods sold the rule was
96
that caveat eiaptor applied when goods had been 
examined. This is made clear in Mellor, J's judgement 
in Jones v. Just (see above). The first point in his 
classification of cases on sale is: "Where goods are 
in esse, and may be inspected by the buyer, and there 
is no fraud on the part of the seller, the maxim 
caveat emptor applies, even though the defect which 
exists in them is latent, and not discoverable on 
examination, at least where the seller is neither the 
grower nor manufacturer."
Another area in which the concept of warranty of
quality was developing was sale by sample. Benjamin
states: "The first and most general Cimplied warranty!
is, that in a sale of goods by sample, the vendor
warrants the quality of the bulk to be equal to that 
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of the sample." However the cases do not show a
consistent line of reasoning. There were decisions
59
where this rule was followed e.g. Parker v. Palmer 
where it was clearly stated that showing a sample of 
goods had the same effect as expressly warranting that 
the goods would correspond with the sample. However 
the law in application was not as simple as Benjamin's 
statement would imply and the courts showed at times 
reluctance to declare contracts to be "sale by 
sample". In Gardiner v. Gray (above), for example, 
Lord Ellenborough held that although samples of waste 
silk had been shown to the plaintiff before the 
contract had been concluded, he could not successfully
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claim that the silk should correspond with the sample 
because the written contract contained no such 
stipulation. "The sample was not produced as a 
warranty that the bulk corresponded with it, but to 
enable the purchaser to form a reasonable judgement of 
the commodity." (The plaintiff here did succeed on 
the grounds that the goods did not conform with their 
description and were not saleable as waste silk.)
In another notable case at about the same time,
60
Meyer v. Everth and Another, the sale note did not 
refer to the sample and for this reason the buyer was 
not allowed to show that a sample had been exhibited 
to him and that the bulk delivered was greatly 
inferior in quality and value. Lord Ellenborough 
said: "It was no part of the contract that the sugar 
should be equal to the sample."
There was controversy as to whether it was relevant
to ask if the seller who displayed a sample was the
manufacturer of the goods or merely a retailer selling
61
on goods manufactured by someone else.
So in the area of sale by sample, as in others, 
there were directly conflicting decisions, many 
seeming to depend on what was most expedient in the 
circumstances.
To categorise these concepts and cases in any
98
logical sequence in the period before the 1893 Act is 
not possible and so in one way the law of sale as 
regards implied warranties did need codification, but 
certainly not for the reasons given by Chalmers when 
addressing the American Bar Association.
3. REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY
Benjamin describes three remedies which were open to
the buyer when goods turned out to be inferior in
62
quality to that which had been warranted:
1. He could refuse to accept the goods and return 
them (except in the case of a specific chattel where 
the property had passed to him, see below).
2. He could accept the goods and bring an action for 
the breach of warranty i.e. claim damages.
3. If he had not yet paid the price he could plead 
breach of warranty to reduce the award made to the 
seller in his action for the price.
Number 1. would apply for example, in the case of an 
executory agreement with a warranty of quality where 
the buyer had never seen the goods. The buyer lost
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his right to return the goods if his conduct implied
acceptance of them or if he consumed more than was
necessry for testing them, or had offered to resell 
63
them etc.
The second remedy is stated by Benjamin to rest on
the general rule that an action for damages lies in
every case of a breach of promise made by one party to
another, for consideration. Where damages were
claimed, the measure was the difference between the
64
article delivered and the article as warranted.
As regards the third remedy Benjamin discusses the
65
leading cases where this had been used.
Because of the case of Street v. Blay in
66
1S31 problems arose where the property passed at once
to the buyer. This case was treated as having the
effect of deciding that once property in a specific
chattel had passed, the buyer could not reject the
goods for breach of warranty i.e. he could not
67
unilaterally revest the title in the seller. The
cases which went before Street provide ample authority
for the proposition that there was a right of
rejection in this situation (see especially Poulton 
68
v. Lattimore in 1829 where the court accepted 
without question that the buyer could reject goods 
which did not correspond to warranty). Stoljar gives 
a full citation of other similar decisions before
100
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Street. Despite the novelty of its findings the
doctrine in Street was all too readily accepted by the
70
courts and followed, notably in Dawson v. Coll is.
Indeed the reasoning in the case was extended, and by
the time of the famous case of Kennedy v. Panama in 
71
1867 the rule was settled that a breach of warranty 
did not entitle rejection unless there was an express 
condition to that effect.
Street v. Blay was also of importance because it
meant that the courts had to ask whether each case
concerned a specific chattel or a sale by
description. The idea that sale of a specific chattel
had a particular effect in restricting the remedies
available was carried to extremes in Heyworth v. 
72
Hutchinson where the buyer was held bound to accept 
goods even though the property had not passed, he had 
no opportunity to inspect before purchase and the 
goods were inferior to the warranty of quality. It 
was decided that the contract was for specific goods 
and Blackburn, J. said "... when the contract is as to 
specific goods, the clause Cof warranty! is only 
collateral to the contract, and is the subject of a 
cross action, or matter in reduction of damages.”
Despite its rather doubtful origins (and some 
confusion as to how far its doctrine should extend, 
see Heyworth above) Chalmers regarded the decision in 
Street v. Blay as settled law, and the Act is clear
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that breach of a warranty did not give the right to 
reject the goods but merely to claim damages (Sections 
11 (1) (b) and 62).
The decision in Street v. Blay when compared with
Scots common law (or indeed without comparing it to
anything) appears unfair to the buyer, who in many
circumstances would not be adequately compensated by
damages while having to retain faulty goods. Also, as
73
Stoljar points out, the concept of not permitting 
the buyer to revest the subject of the contract is 
used arbitrarily in this particular context, as he 
could revest the property in the case of fraud.
4. WARRANTY OF TITLE
Surprisingly the question of whether or not the seller
warranted that he had good title to what he sold was a
subject on which the law in England was rather
confused. In certain situations the law was clear and
Benjamin sets out his formulation of the rules where
74
"there is no conflict of opinion":
1. In an executory agreement the seller warranted 
his title by implication.
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2. In a sale of an ascertained specific chattel an 
affirmation by the seller that it was his was regarded 
as equivalent to a warranty of title- This warranty 
could be implied from words, conduct or from "the 
nature and circumstances of the sale-"
3- In the absence of any such implication, where no 
express warranty was given, the seller by the mere 
sale of something did not warrant his title to sell.
4. If however the seller knew he had no title he was 
of course liable in fraud.
The point at issue was whether an innocent vendor by
selling something was implying that he had a good
title to the goods in question. Benjamin discusses
various conflicting authorities, several of which were
to the effect that caveat emptor extended as far as
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the title of the seller.
The leading contemporary case was Morley v 
Attenborough in which the facts were that a
pawnbroker sold a harp which had been deposited with 
him; the pledge had been forfeited. It transpired 
that the harp had not belonged to the person who had 
pawned it, and it was argued that there was no
warranty of title, express or implied. The plaintiff 
claimed that "...in consideration that the plaintiff
would buy a harp for a certain sum, the defendant
promised that he ...had lawful right to sell it." 
Parke, B. notes how remarkable it was that there 
"...should be any doubt...Cin3 a question so likely to 
be of common occurrence." He goes on "The bargain and 
sale of a specific chattel, by our law, undoubtedly 
transfers all the property the vendor has... But it 
is made a question whether there is annexed by law to 
such a contract... an implied agreement on the part of 
the vendor that he has the ability to convey."
Such a warranty was implied in executory contracts
(see Benjamin's rules above); the problem existed in
contracts which operated to transmit the property
where nothing was said about title. (It is
interesting to note in passing that the English court
in Morley v. Attenborough was misled by Bell's
exposition of the Scottish position in his Inquiries
into the Contract of Sale, page 94, see Section II.)
The conclusion was reached in Morley that "The result
of the older authorities is, that there is by the law
of England no warranty of title in the actual contract
of sale, any more than there is of quality. The rule
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of caveat emptor applies to both..." "...it would 
seem that there is no implied warranty on the sale of 
goods and that if there be no fraud a vendor is not 
liable for a bad title, unless there is an express
warranty, or an equivalent to it, by declarations or
78
conduct." "...it appears unreasonable to consider 
the pawnbroker, from the nature of his occupation, as
undertaking anything more than that the subject of
sale is a pledge... he gains no better title... than
79
the pawner had. "
The decision in Morley v. Attenborough was
80
confirmed the following year in Chapman v. Speller 
which held simply that there was no implied warranty 
in the contract of sale that the seller had title to 
the goods.
This was the theory, but the practical effect of the
rules as formulated by Benjamin was that in many
circumstances the exceptions had become the rule by 
81
1893. The position was that at common law it did not
fallow from the very act of selling that the seller
warranted his title or right to sells there was an
implied undertaking that he did not know he had no
right to sell, but in the absence of fraud there seems
to have been no liability incurred by passing on a bad
title unless there was an express warranty or
equivalent. The exceptions to the so called rule were
of basic significances in a shop, for example, the
seller was considered to warrant that the buyer would
82
have a good title.
83
Benjamin reviews the cases in point and lays
84
particular stress on Eichholz v. Banister in which 
the judgement of Erie, C.J. is explicit, confirming 
that the mere act of selling does not imply a warranty
105
of title, but in the situation where a shopkeeper is 
the seller he, by his conduct, affirms that he is the
owner of the goods sold. His judgement takes the
exception to the rule so far as to say: "...in all
ordinary sales the party who undertakes to sell,
exercises thereby the strongest act of dominion over 
the chattel which he proposes to sell and would, 
therefore, as I think, commonly lead the purchaser to 
believe that he is the owner of the chattel."
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As a result of these cases Benjamin states "...in
modern times, in all ordinary sales, the vendor by
exercising the highest act of dominion over the thing
in offering it for sale, thereby leads a purchaser to
believe that he is owner." Benjamin maintains that
Eichholz altered the law so that "the exceptions
86
become the rule." He states the law as being as
follows: "A sale of personal chattels implies an
affirmation by the vendor that the chattel is his, and
therefore he warrants the title, unless it be shown by
the facts and circumstances of the sale that the
vendor did not intend to assert ownership, but only to
transfer such interest as he might have in the chattel 
87
sold."
One could be forgiven for being confused as to which 
were the "rules" and which the "exceptions", and for 
drawing the conclusion that in this particular 
instance, as in others in this general field, the
reason for the confusion lies in a lack of basic 
principles from which to draw more detailed rules. 
However this may be, such was the state of affairs in 
1893 — Chalmers in his editions of 1890 and 1894 when 
dealing with implied warranty of title cites Eichholz 
v. Banister, Morley v. Attenborough, Sims v. 
Marryat and Benjamin's statement of the law.
1. Chalmers - Codification of Mercantile Law 1903 19 
L.Q.R. 10
2. see for example R.M.Goode, Commercial Law p.147
3. S.J.Stoljar, 1953 16 M.L.R. 174 at 197
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p. 1
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Lord Bowen at 175
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8. J.P.Benjamin p. 213
9. (1814) 2 M.& S.397
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17. Blackburn p.173
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20. Simons v. Swift (1826) 5 B.& C. 857
21. Martineau v. Kitching (1872) L.R. 7 Q.B. 436 at
456 per Blackburn J.
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SECTION IV - SALE OF GOODS ACT 1893
It -follows from a comparative reading of Sections II
and III that the passing of the 1893 Act created
considerable difficulties in Scots law- Some of the
anomalies which were created are relatively trivial
and no more than irritating instances of the haste and
lack of due care with which the Bill was extended to
Scotland- Others, however, are much more serious and
far reaching, and indeed some of the problems and
ambiguities which arise out of the Act apply equally
in both jurisdictions, with the result that several
basic aspects of the law remain unclear today- The
Act more or less codified the law as set out in
Section III. Where there were uncertainties and
inconsistencies in the English common law Chalmers
either committed himself to one point of view or
referred to conflicting cases, ignoring the fact that
1
their decisions were incompatible.
This section is in no way intended to be a detailed 
account of the law of sale of goods as it affects 
Scotland and England. It is an attempt to identify 
some aspects of this area of law which are
problematical- Some of the problems were inherent in
Ill
the English common law of sale and have merely been 
transformed into problems of statute law; some of the 
problems have been created in Scotland because of the 
imposition of more or less meaningless alien English 
rules. This Section is divided as follows:
1. Property provisions
1. Risk
2. Passing of property
2. Quality provisions
1. Section 13
2. Section 14
3. Remedies for breach of warranty of quality
1. PROPERTY PROVISIONS
1. RISK
Chalmers, in carrying out his task of codifying 
English law as it stood in 1893, automatically adopted 
the English rule linking risk with ownership. A
112
definition of the term was apparently thought to be
unnecessary when the Act was framed- Section 20
enacts the rule that risk passes with property
(subject to the statutory exceptions: contrary
agreement between the parties (S.20(1)), the
provisions as to fault (S.20(2)) and the provisions as
to the risks of transit (Ss.32,33)). This means that
the odd rule of Roman law which separated passing of
property and risk in the Scots common law was changed
in favour of the English rule as regards sale of
goods- It also means that risk in Scots law, being
now linked with ownership, can pass by bare
agreement. In areas still regulated by common law the
old rule survives e.g. if a building is destroyed
after a contract of sale but before a conveyance is
2
executed the Roman rule applies. Although some modern 
systems have maintained the Roman rule in sale (e.g. 
the Swiss Code, South African law) it is generally 
regarded as being extremely harsh on the buyer.
The linking of risk and ownership is, it is 
submitted, preferable to the old common law position. 
T.B.Smith, however, seems to feel that any improvement 
is only marginal as he claims that to link risk to
passing of property by consent "... lacks any apparent
3
rational basis.1
4
The International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law 
has set out the passible solutions to the problem of
113
passing of risk as adapted by the world's main legal 
systems. The analysis can be reduced to two possible 
principles governing the passing of risks
1. Risk passes on conclusion of the contract — this 
is the same as the rule linking risk with ownership.
2. Risk passes on delivery.
The latter of these two rules is more appropriate 
where unascertained goods are involved. This is 
usually the case in commercial contracts of sale where 
risk is more likely to become a factor than in 
transactions involving individuals as consumers. The 
other main argument in favour of the second 
alternative is that the seller who stores goods is in 
a better position than the buyer to arrange adequate 
insurance cover. The leading example of a system 
which puts this risk theory into practice is German 
law. There is, of course, with this risk theory the 
problem of the buyer who gains possession subject to
reservation of title — in the German system the risk
here would be on the buyer.
As indicated above the principle that risk passes 
with ownership (or on conclusion of the contract) has
no application where goods are unascertained. As
under the British legislation property does not pass 
until the goods have been ascertained, whether the
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seller has effectively appropriated the goods to the
contract may therefore be vital to the question of
risk. The British system has the added disadvantage
of raising possible questions of fault. The
respective liabilities of the parties can be a complex
matter. Are both parties at fault or has the default
of one excused performance by the other? A variety of
questions is raised, e.g. what is the extent of the
seller's duty as custodier? If both parties are in
breach, and neither breach excuses the other, what are
5
the rights of the parties to the contract?
The conclusion drawn by the International 
Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law is that "The passing 
of risk upon delivery is the modern solution. It 
conforms with commercial views and practices; it has 
been adopted by the most recent national and 
international codifications." The Uniform Law on 
International Sales Act 1967 deals with risk and 
property as being independent of each other, and 
Schedule 1, Article 97 provides "The risk shall pass 
to the buyer when delivery of the goods is effected in 
accordance with the provisions of the contract and the 
present law."
Goode suggests that the solution to the problem of
6
risk is to link risk with control, and he gives
7
examples of what is meant by control. This idea of 
control is the rule used in the U.N. Convention on
115
Contracts for the International Bale of Goods drawn up 
in 19B0.
In modern commercial conditions the concept of risk
is of vital importance - "the location of the
ownership of the goods is in itself of minor
8
importance compared with the location of the risk-"
Many contracts contain specific provisions as regards
passing of risk, insurance etc- In the case of
uncertainty S.20 would apply. A seller retaining
title, to be sure of protecting his interest, may
insure the goods himself and add the premium to the
9
price.
In practice business people do not leave risk to be 
determined by the rules set out in the Act; they cover 
as many eventualities as can be foreseen by
insurance. This fact does not mean, however, that the 
provisions of the Act as they affect risk have no 
practical application, because of the principle of 
subrogation, which shifts the interest in issues of 
risk and liability where there is no waiver of 
subrogation clause.
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2. PASSING OF PROPERTY
However unimportant passing of property may be, when
compared with the passing of risk (see above) it is
essential to be able to ascertain when and whether
ownership has passed, both as a concept in its own
right, and because it determines the location of the
risk in the absence of agreement to the contrary- One
of the most basic alterations to the Scots common law
system was made by Section 1 of the S.G.A. which
provided that property could pass to the buyer when
the contract was made without delivery- There can be
little argument that the Scots rule as to delivery
could not have met the rquirements of modern
commercial life- Constructive and symbolic delivery
10
were recognised but the Scottish courts were not 
very happy with the concept of constitutum 
possessoriam, as the transfer of ownership would not 
be apparent to third parties- Add to this the 
anomalous rule as to the passing of risk and the 
undesirability of having different rules in England 
and Scotland on such a basic aspect of commercial law 
and it is clear that in theory a change in the Scots 
common law positon was appropriate by 1893- However 
the rules which were enacted as regards the passing of
117
property are the worst example in the Act of statutory 
provisions which were wholly inappropriate to Scots 
law and not at all clear in the English context 
either.
11
Writing in an article in 1891 (when the Bill was
still going through its Pariiamentary stages) Brown
refers to "special difficulties" in assimilating the
Scots and English laws on sale. He agrees that it may
"shock some legal prejudices to find that Lord Watson
proposes to assimilate by yielding the Scottish
principle" i.e. as to delivery. Brown then proceeds
to stress the two areas of Scots law which had been
criticised as in need of reform (vizs the rule as to
passing of risk, and the unfortunate position, vis a
vis the seller's creditors, of a buyer who had paid
the price but not yet taken delivery). He almost
ignores the fundamental change which was proposed, and
the fact that the terminology in the Bill was wholly
inappropriate to effect changes in Scots law. In June
12
1892 in another article he wrote that the Bill was
"not yet beyond criticism." He expressed his surprise
as regards the rule on tradition that "... the
suggested adaption of the English principle has met
with so little opposition in Scotland." Brown assumes
the reason for this lack of opposition to have been
the "weighty" and "convincing" nature of the arguments
13
in favour of the change. 6ow places another 
interpretation on the lack of protest from the
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profession in Scotland: "How Ethe 1893 ActD came to be 
applied to Scotland may be a mystery Scots lawyers are 
not anxious to have solved.1
In this second article Brown again skates over the
difficulties which were being created as regards
passing of property, merely stressing the need for
assimilation of the two commercial systems, but not
remarking on the fact that true assimilation was not
what was being aimed at, but merely the imposition of
one system upon another. By the time the Act was in
force and Brown had written his Treatise he seems to
take a more realistic approach to what was done in the
Act as regards the property provisions; in his
14
commentary on Section 1 he writes:
"We are thus met at the threshold of the 
Act by an important change in the law of 
Scotland. The principles now imported from 
England have been adversely criticised by 
many of our judges and text-writers and have 
been unfavourably contrasted with the 
Scottish rules now supplanted. There is 
probably truth in much of this criticism, 
but in balancing expediency our legislators 
have deemed it better to assimilate the law, 
even at the sacrifice of more logical and 
better defined principles."
This quotation brings out an important point: the 
English property rules are not necessarily 
objectionable merely on the grounds that they are 
different from the Scots principles; they also have
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many internal problems which, combined with the 
difficulty of incorporating them into Scots law, 
present the Scots lawyer with some almost 
unintelligible statutory provisions. Absolute
adherence to the simple Scots rules was, as noted 
above, becoming increasingly impossible as commerce 
became more complex; however no attempt was made to 
develop terminology which would be meaningful in both 
jurisdictions.
The truth of this is seen in the use in the Act of
the words "ownership" "property" and "title". Of these
only property is defined in the Act and that in purely
English terms: " 'Property' means the general property
15
in goods, and not merely a special property." . As
noted in Section III the term property in English law
has no readily definable meaning, the law having
developed through the provision of remedies (e.g. the
tort of conversion) rather than by building on logical
principles. "Since the 1893 Act was introducing new
concepts and policies of law so far as Scotland was
concerned, it might have been thought appropriate for
the Act to make clear what was meant by 'property'in
the context of these provisions. An ostensible
definition is provided in Section 62 ...Since Scots
law has never known the concept of 'special property'
and since the 'definition' does not explain what is
meant by 'general property' the legislators have not
16
been very helpful to Scots lawyers at least."
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The most basic distinction in the use of the word 
property is between "property" as a kind of right, and 
"property" as an object of a legal right, "Title" 
means the connection of a legal right between a person 
and a thing, and can be of several kinds, title as 
owner, as pledgee, as borrower, as custodier. The Act 
does not make this clear.
English law does not appear to lay great stress on
the concept of property in the sense of ownership, but
acknowledges a hierarchy based on the better right to
17
possess goods. The provisions as to passing of 
property in the Act are far from clear even to English 
lawyers. In the field of personal property in English 
law there does not exist any orderly system of legal 
concepts, and this is all too obvious in the S.G.A. 
1893.
This idea of "relative title" has been described as
18
one of the key concepts in the law of property. This
means that "ownership" only has meaning as regards a
particular individual in a particular situation. "The
concept of absolute ownership, by which is meant an
indefeasible title to the absolute interest in the
19
particular property, is ...elusive ..."
One of the problems raised by the fact that basic 
terms are left undefined is that of how to supply the
121
missing definitions. Brown seemed to think that the
gaps in this respect should be filled by reference to
20
the English common law. Most Scots lawyers would
reject this reasoning as does the Scottish Law 
21
Commission. It is hard to imagine what was in the 
minds of those who assisted in the Bill's extension to 
Scotland (e.g. the Glasgow Faculty of Procurators who
produced an “elaborate report, specially devoted to
22
the adaptation of the Bill to Scotland" ) but it is 
not reasonable to assume that they expected Scots 
lawyers to discover the meaning of such vital concepts 
from pre-1894 English cases, which were not 
authoritative in Scotland and were frequently, to a 
Scots lawyer, difficult to understand.
Few clues can be drawn from the contexts in which
particular words are used in the Act. The person
selling goods is sometimes called “the seller",
sometimes "the owner" - however it does not appear
where "owner" is used that it has any different
meaning from "seller" (see e.g. S.1(1)). Neither word
23
seems to indicate a concept of absolute ownership.
Section 1(1) and (3) refer to "property in goods".
24
Battersby and Preston argue that the concept of 
"property" here includes title, but point out that 
nothing is said about the quality of that title "which 
may be good, bad or indifferent on the scale of 
relativity". The use of the word "property" in Ss.
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16-20 which group of sections is headed “Transfer of 
property as between seller and buyer" has caused 
controversy. Some English authorities have considered 
that the heading "Transfer of title" before the next 
group of sections, Ss.21-26, indicates a difference in 
meaning. Others claim that the terms used in the 
headings mean the same but regulate the legal 
relationships involved from different viewpoints.
Battersby and Preston concede that the use of the 
two distinct terms "property" and "title" might imply 
that some distinction was intended, but do not accept 
that the Act effectively draws a contrast between 
property and title. They point out that the heading 
"Transfer of property as between seller and buyer" is 
only a heading and not part of the Act. In the 
sections the word property is used alone, and use is 
not made of the phrase "property as between seller and 
buyer". Battersby and Preston argue that Ss.16-20 are 
concerned with the normal case where the effect of the 
sale is to transfer the seller's property in the goods 
to the buyer. Ss.21-26 are concerned with exceptional 
cases where the seller has a defective title but he 
can nevertheless transfer the property in the goods to 
someone buying in good faith. Thus they conclude that 
the reason for the different headings is "to draw 
attention to the fact that, although the property has 
passed under the ordinary provisions, nevertheless the 
buyer's property may be defeated if by another
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transaction the property is acquired by a purchaser in
good faith in circumstances falling within the
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exceptions to the nemo dat rule."
Battersby and Preston develop a detailed refutation
of Atiyah's views on the subject of the two headings.
Atiyah finds the terminology of the Act more puzzling
than Battersby and Preston seem to: "... the Act talks
of a transfer of property as between seller and buyer,
and contrasts this with the transfer of title. It is
trite learning, however, that the distinguishing
feature of property rights is that they bind not
merely the immediate parties to the transaction, but
also all third parties. How, then, can there be such
a legal phenomenon as a transfer of property as
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between seller and buyer?" Atiyah, in trying to
discover what is involved in "this peculiar legal
conception which the Act calls 'the property in the
goods'", concludes that what we must do to unravel the
mystery is to consider the consequences which flow
from the mere passing of property as opposed to the
consequences which follow when the buyer has acquired
full title binding upon third parties. He is trying
to make a distinction between the meaning of property
and title as used in the Act. However no such
distinction is manifest from the face of the statute
and it is a hard one for the Scots lawyer to grasp.
27
Atiyah makes a most revealing comments
"One cannot but reflect how much simpler
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the position would have been had the common 
law and the Sale of Goods Act adopted the 
rule of Roman law that the property in the 
goods passes on and not before delivery. 
Had this been done all the special rights of 
the unpaid seller might have been 
unnecessary, as also would Sects 24 and 25. 
Then also the term 'property' would have 
retained its usual meaning instead of being 
debased to signify anything more than the 
personal rights of the buyer which arise 
from the mere contract."
The two headings seem to have been "little remarked"
before an article by Lawson in 1949 discussed the
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problems surrounding passing of property. Lawson
considers that in the heading "Transfer of property as
between seller and buyer" Chalmers was giving effect
to the idea that third parties should not be adversely
affected by anything agreed on by the parties inter se
in the contract of sale unless they had notice of 
29
it. Without expressly acknowledging the difficulty
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caused in Scots law by the 1893 Act, Lawson states
"It would have been, to say the least, 
unnatural for the Roman jurists to have used 
the language of the headings in the Sale of 
Goods Act ...for a relation arising out of a 
contract and limited in its effect tD the 
parties to it was completely expressed in 
terms of obligation, and the language of 
ownership was confined to cases where a 
third party might be affected; the Roman law 
of property was exclusively concerned with 
iura in rem. On the other hand, in the 
common law the treatment of the contract of 
sale as passing the property in goods 
preceded in time the recognition of its 
obligatory effect, debt and detinue being in 
origin proprietary rather than contractual 
remedies; hence the difficulty has been to 
see that later developments have limited the 
effects of the passing of property to the 
relations between the parties."
Although this is Lawson's interpretation of the
relevance of the headings, his idea is not developed
in the body of the Act which merely refers to
“property11 in general terms and to “passing of title
by a person who is not the owner.” The Scottish Law
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Commission's comment on Lawson's approach is:
"If we understand him correctly it would 
seem that, whereas in systems derived from 
the Roman law the emphasis was on the law of 
obligations, in English law the property 
effect of sale originally took precedence 
and affected third parties, but was later 
mitigated in their favour- This may in part 
explain why the provisions of the Sale of 
Goods Act 1893, which were mainly concerned 
to formulate the English common law, leave 
so considerable a legacy of unsolved, and 
possibly from a Scots lawyer's viewpoint 
almost insoluble, problems."
To illustrate the various provisions of Ss-16-26 of 
the Act modern editors of Chalmers' book use examples 
drawn from decided cases to show what is meant by the 
various sections but, following the example of their 
illustrious predecessor, do not comment on the use of 
the two headings.
There is obviously no “correct" view to be drawn 
from the opposing arguments as to the significance of 
the headings. These disagreements merely serve to 
illustrate the shortcomings of an Act which purports 
to regulate one of the most common of contracts.
Section 12 of the 1893 Act envisages a seller who 
has the capacity to pass an indefeasible title but not
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every seller has this: nemo dat quod non habet is the
■Fundamental English rule of the law of property as
regards title and, as few exceptions are allowed to 
this rigidly held maxim, the law naturally tends
towards a lack of protection for third parties- Where 
goods are sold by someone who is not the owner, and 
who does not have the authority of the owner to sell 
them, the purchaser acquires no better title than the 
seller had. This general rule applies where goods
have been stolen or acquired under a void contract. 
There are, however, exceptions both at common law and 
under statute (S.G.A. and Factors Acts). The effect of 
the rule is that "...Although a transfer may comply 
with the legal formalities required for the transfer 
of the interest in question, it may yet fail to take
effect because the transferor has no title to
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transfer."
The nemo dat maxim did not co—exist very happily 
with the doctrine of transfer of property by mental 
assent, nor, as the nineteenth century progressed, 
with the growing use of agents or factors who bought 
and sold goods for others and raised money on the 
security of goods. As commercial dealings became more 
complex the Factors Acts were passed, representing the 
outcome of friction between commercial interests and 
English common law principles.
A full discussion of the background to the Factors
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Acts 1823-1899 (which were purely English in their
aims and terminology) is beyond the scope of this 
33
paper. (The Factors Acts are not only of background
interest in regard to the S.G.A. — S.25(1) and S.47 of
the 1893 Act re-enacted with minor changes of wording
SS.8, 9 and 10 of the Factors Act 1889.) The main
purpose of the 1889 Act was to qualify the nemo dat
rule; the Factors (Scotland) Act 1890, however,
inexplicably extended the 1889 Act to Scotland.
Briefly, one of the problems of the nemo dat rule was
that it meant that the mere fact of possession did not
enable someone to dispose of goods in contravention of
his instructions about them. It was argued (by
merchants finding a man in possession of goods and
disposing of them in the way of his business) that in
the interests of commerce if someone was left in
possession of goods or documents of title he should be
treated as owner by innocent third parties. After
all, "Credit, not distrust is the basis of commercial 
34
dealings." The English common law did not view 
things in this light, legal theory having been 
developed from situations where things had gone 
wrong. Another problem was the rise of the warehouse 
system whichs brought into use documents of title 
representing goods: commercial interests wanted
negotiability for these documents.
The unitary system of ownership and possession in 
Scots law meant that it did not suffer from the
defects which the Factors Acts aimed to remedy. In
the Scottish system the courts had little difficulty
in protecting the bona fide purchaser "...Whenever a
merchant entrusts his agent either with the actual
possession of his goods or with such documents as
enables the agent at pleasure to obtain such
possession he thereby gives the agent power
effectively to give over the goods to anyone bona fide
contracting with him, either for a purchase of the
35
goods, or an advance on their security." It was
accepted also that the endorsement and delivery of a
36
bill of lading was equivalent to tradition and if a
document of title or a delivery order was endorsed and
intimation made to the custodier of goods (in
circumstances where both seller and custodier were
barred from denying the intention that symbolic
37
delivery should be effected ) this also effected
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delivery. Lord President Inglis put it thus: 
"Constructive delivery converts the custodier of the 
goods from the servant or agent of the seller to the 
servant or agent of the buyer... Legal tradition has 
been made of the subject of the contract of sale; and 
there is an end of the real right of the seller..." 
He went on to explain the distinction between the laws 
of Scotland and England as regards the seller's rights 
in goods which have been sold but not delivered: in
Scots law the seller remains undivested owner whether 
the price has been paid or not; that is to say that 
the seller could never be asked to part with the goods
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until the price was paid. He could retain the goods
against the buyer and his assignees until debts were
paid. This however was not a lien - a  lien exists
over the property of another. Once tradition had
taken place the seller's remedy was a personal action
for the price. The unpaid seller's lien came into
Scots law with the 1893 Act. The concept of stoppage
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in transitu came in via the House of Lords in 1790.
Instead of stoppage in transitu Scots law had (and,
40
argues Gow, still has ) the doctrine of 
41
revendicatio.
Thus in the latter half of the nineteenth century 
the Scots courts were expounding a clear theory of 
mercantile law firmly based on the reality of 
developing commerce. Even before 1893 considerable 
damage was done to this process by the House of Lords.
42 43
In Dimmack v. Dixon and Bovill v. Dixon the
facts were the same. Each case concerned a document
of title to iron made payable to the bearer. The
document ended up in the hands of a holder who had
acquired bona fide and who had no connection with the
original contract between the seller and the grantee
of the document. The granter turned out to be an
unpaid seller who wished to retain the goods i.e. he
wanted to enforce the obligation to pay the price
against the latest holder. The documents of title
were held, according to the meaning on their face, to
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be negotiable in Scots law - the bearer had no need to
enquire into the circumstances of the contract. No
proof or custom of trade was required. The questions
raised in the two cases were identical (the granter of
the documents in each case was the same individual).
Bovill was decided two years before Dimmack, but six
months after the decision in Dimmack the House of
Lords heard Bovill on appeal. The importance of
Dimmack had been acknowledged: it was heard by the
whole court. In Bovill v. Dixon judgment was given
by a single English judge, Lord Chancellor Cranworth,
the only law peer present, the rest of the court being
made up of laymen (the Appellate Jurisdiction Act was
not passed until 1876). His Lordship declared the
document in question to be invalid and non—negotiable
and reached the following conclusion: "The effect of
such a document, if valid, is to give a floating right
of action to any person who may become possessed of
it... this cannot be tolerated by the law either of
Scotland or of England... If the convenience of those
engaged in trade and commerce requires that scrip
notes of this description should be made legal and
valid, that must be effected, if at all, by the
legislature..." The inconsistencies in the reasoning
of this judgment and the Lord Chancellor's ignorance
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of Scots law are fully exposed by Brown who gives a 
very full and fascinating account of the history of 
Bovill and Dimmack and the arguments in the cases.
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In 1871 in Vickers v. Hertz the Lords delivered
an opinion in a Scottish appeal which Brown describes
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as "unforeseen and startling-" The House of Lords
held that the Factors Acts applied to Scotland. This
had not been the understanding of the law up to that 
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time because of the perfectly satisfactory common
law position which gave to a factor all the powers
relative to his principal that the English Acts gave
him- The House of Lords appeared to ignore totally
the arguments and authorities on which the Court of
Session judgment was based and to found their decision
entirely on the Factors Act 1842- It was not made
clear what passible relevance the Factors Acts could
have to Scots law at that time. This decision
naturally caused considerable confusion in future
cases: the most outstanding example being the
48
celebrated case of Inglis v- Robertson and Baxter.
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The 1889 Act was extended to Scotland in 1890 and as 
noted above some of the principal provisions of the 
Factors Acts were embodied in the U.K. legislation.
As has been seen, the "quality of title " to be
transferred comes under S.12 of the S.G.A. The concept
of "right to sell" in terms of S.12 replaced the
Scottish warrandice against eviction. There has been
much controversy about the situation where the seller
has no right to sell the goods. In Rowland v.
50
Divall a stolen car was bought in good faith and
then sold on to another bona fide buyer. The car was
132
51
later repossessed by the police. Atkin, L.J. 
observed "the buyer has not received any part of that 
which he contracted to receive — namely, the property 
and right to possession - and, that being so, there 
has been a total failure of consideration." In fact 
the buyer had had the use of the car for four months.
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Atiyah accepts Rowland v. Divall and cases which 
followed it as authoritative. Battersby and Preston, 
however, describe the conclusions of Atkin, L.J. and 
Atiyah as "palpably untrue" and seem to argue that the 
facts in Rowland indicate a valid contract of sale but 
one where only a "possessory title" was transferred 
and the implied promise of good title in S.12 was 
broken. "Thus the mere fact that a possessory title
is transferred does not prevent the transfer from
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being a sale." It is surely beyond the imaginative
powers of a Scots lawyer to frame a comment on this
statement! The thinking behind it is that in terms of
S.1 and S.12 "it is not the transfer of a good title
which is fundamental to the transaction but the
transfer of a title... the rights of the seller as
against others having a better title have no bearing
on the power of the seller to pass whatever title he 
54
may have." Battersby and Preston make it clear 
however that they are not considering here cases where 
the seller has nothing at all to convey to the buyer —
i.e. where he has never been in possession of the 
goods in question and lacks any title. "Our point is,
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therefore, that provided a title is transferred, the
transaction is properly called a sale under the Act,
and the question of quality of title is a matter
55
extraneous to that." This debate, like so much else
related to the Act, has no relevance to Scots law.
There does not seem to be anything in English law
corresponding to the Scots concept of warrandice of
title - the system of course is based on caveat
emptor. It is difficult to make any logical
connection between the common law of Scotland and the
provisions of S.12s "So far as Scots law is concerned
the whole of section 12 is an excrescence, adding
nothing to but rather both in thought and language
56
confusing the common law."
It is perhaps worth making the point that the
English tort of conversion was not extended to Scots
law. In Scots common law someone who deals bona fide
with the goods of another is bound only by the
obligation of restitution and possibly that of
recompense if he has made a profit when disposing of 
57
them.
One of the main problems with the S.S.A. was that 
the concept of passing of property when parties
intended (S.17) was already outmoded by 1893. It
assumes that the usual contract of sale concerns 
specific goods; this is and has been since 1894
increasingly not the case. As pointed out by Diplock,
134
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L.J. in Ward v. Bignall "In modern times very 
little is needed to give rise to the inference that 
the property in specific goods is to pass only on 
delivery or payment."
The position as from 1894 in Scotland was that an 
anomalous situation had arisen: the common law as
regards traditio regulated the transfer of moveables 
(e.g. on loan or in pledge), while sale of goods
became a statutory exception. However as there have
been few decided cases in Scotland perhaps the
conclusion must be drawn that no serious difficulties 
have resulted in practice, such conflicts as have 
arisen being settled by agreement or arbitration. 
Even if one were to argue in the light of this factual 
situation for no change in this aspect of sale of 
goods legislation, the fact remains that the property 
sections of the S.G.A. are obscure in England and 
Scotland and that at least the meanings of "property" 
"title" and "owner" should be properly defined in a
way which is meaningful in both England and Scotland.
It is apparent from this outline of the situation 
that it is no longer possible to draw up any clear 
systematic account of the Scots law of passing of 
property in sale. The common law as it was prior to 
1856 and the position between 1856 and 1894 have been 
set out in Section II. S.61(2) of the 1893 Act runs as 
follows:- "The rules of the common law... save in so
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far as they are inconsistent with the express
provisions of this Act-.. shall continue to apply to
contracts for the sale of goods. 1 The problem is how
to "graft on" to the common law of sale those features
of the Act which have little or no meaning or
relevance in Scots law. We are left with different
"layers" of law built up one on top of another (the
common law up. to 1856, the position between 1856 and
1894, the Factors ( Scotland ) Act 1890, the changes
made in 1B94) but not forming a coherent system of
rules based on a set of principles. Gow gives vent to
his frustration in characteristic manner "If there is
any moral in all this it may well be that the Scots
negotiators of the Act of Union ought reasonably to
have foreseen the trials and tribulations with which
in consequence of their actings they were to afflict
Scots law. On the other hand, could they reasonably
have foreseen that a legal profession would so tamely
submit to the infliction upon their system of ... the
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Sale of Goods Act... ?" He poses the question
"...how much of our indigenous law survives capable of
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imaginative application to present day needs?" His 
answer is "... those aspects which are not absolutely 
irreconcilable with the empirical rules of Lthe3 
statute. Much depends on judicial boldness and the 
willingness of the profession actively to protect its 
raison d ' e t r e However while in terms of S.61(2) 
this answer to the question posed may have some 
validity in theory, it would require a good deal more
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that judicial boldness and a Milling legal profession 
to resurrect the Scots common law from the confusion 
which has followed the Act. In any case there would
appear to be little point in expending mental energy
in such an exercise, which would result in differences 
North and South of the border and would do nothing to 
extract and fuse the best from both legal traditions.
There are salutary lessons to be learned by
legislative draftsmen, politicians and lawyers in all
branches of the profession from a study of the history
of the 1893 Act, but almost a century after the
passing of the S.G.A. there is no sign that the
agencies involved in the framing and passing of
legislation are alive to the aftermath of the work of
their predecessors. The truth of this statement is
nowhere better evinced than in the Consumer Credit Act 
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1974.
2. QUALITY PROVISIONS
The sections of the 1893 Act which affect this aspect
of sale are principally Sections 13 and 14s in
connection with both sections the general point may be
made that the Scottish requirement that the seller
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display "positive morality" was lost in 1893 for
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"priceworthiness was anathema south of the Tweed."
1, SECTION 13
Section 13 corresponds to the pre-1893 English
common law as expounded in such cases as Chanter v.
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Hopkins, Barr v. Gibson, Josling v. Kingsford,
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and Gardiner v. Gray (see Section III). Chalmers' 
intention in framing Section 13 was obviously to 
maintain the distinction between "sale by description" 
and "sale of specific goods" (see Section III). The 
rules as to sale of specific goods evolved so as to be 
disadvantageous to the buyer: as noted in Section III 
there was no implied term as to quality (Barr v. 
Gibson) and no right to reject goods once property had 
passed ( Street v. Blay).
The distinction between the two types of sale has, 
however, been eroded since the Act was passed and 
"sale by description" now covers almost every sale 
because of the extremely wide view which the courts 
have taken in interpreting Section 13 (see below). 
Another factor may be the widespread practice of mail 
order trading.
The condition as to merchantabi1ity in Section 14(2)
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of the 1893 Act only applied to sales by description, 
and this is one of the reasons why the courts proved 
so ready to allow cases to fall under the ambit of 
Section 13. This also explains why many of the cases 
which contain argument as to the meaning of Section 
13, were in fact actions brought under Section 14(2).
Apart from various abjections to Section 13 (as 
regards its provisions) which will be set out below, 
there is of course, from the Scots law point of view, 
an objection to its form, or wording. It is one of 
the sections of the Act which uses the word
“condition" in the English sense; to make this have 
the same meaning in Scots law, we would wish, in
reading Section 13, to substitute the words "material 
term" for the word "condition." The divergence in 
terminology as between Scots and English law leads to 
uncertainty in applying Sections 12 to 15 of the Act. 
The Scots concepts of material and non-material terms 
are recognised in Sections 11(2) and 61(1), but it is 
nowhere made clear in the Act that where the word
"condition" appears in Sections 12 to 15 it is to be 
read in the Scottish context as material term, and the 
word warranty as non—material term. This is an 
important objection to Section 13 from the Scottish 
point of view. There are several others.
68
Gow states that Section 13 is, if taken literally, 
meaningless. This is because of a basic fallacy
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inherent in Section 13. It purports to declare that it
is an implied term of the contract that the seller
must comply with the express terms of the contract.
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It has several times been judicially stated that a
seller does not warrant that he will deliver e.g.
peas but contracts to do so. If instead he delivers
beans he has not merely broken a material term of the
contract but has in fact failed to perform his part of
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the contract. Atiyah points out that Section 13 
would appear to be "...perfarming the somewhat odd 
(and redundant) function of declaring that it is an 
implied term that the seller must comply with express 
terms of the contract."
The section has had very little relevance to sale of
goods problems; nor has it assisted the courts by
clarifying the law. There are a number of reasons for
this. Firstly, the basic fallacy contained in the
section, referred to above, itself caused a good deal 
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of confusion. Further confusion arose because before
the statutory separation of the concepts of
description on the one hand, and quality or fitness on
the other, these had often been combined in the 
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cases and it proved no easy matter to separate the 
elements involved in each i.e. the identity versus 
attributes debate. Also what constitutes the 
description of the goods has always been closely 
connected with the problem of deciding in any given 
case which elements of the contract are terms, and
which mere representations.
There have been very many reported cases, beginning
soon after the Act became law, concerning the meaning
of the word "description1 as used in Section 13. It is
extremely difficult to classify these cases, as so
much depends on the particular circumstances of the
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contract in question, and some basic point of law or 
a distinction which appears to be quite clear in one 
case may be totally inapplicable in another.
As regards the question of whether "description"
extends to the qualitative nature of goods or merely
to identification, the earlier cases tend to approve a
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wide meaning. Notable is Varley v. Whipp where it
was agreed to sell a second hand reaping machine which
the buyer had never seen. The seller stated that it
had been new the previous year and had been used to
cut only fifty or sixty acres. The machine when
delivered turned out to be a very old one. The buyer
was entitled to reject under Section 13, as the court
held that although the contract was one for specific
goods, it was nevertheless a sale by description. It
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was held that the term sale by description "must 
apply to all cases where the purchaser has not seen 
the goods, but is relying on the description alone." 
Another factor which influenced the courts to take a 
wide view of the term "description" in Varley v. 
Whipp, and many other cases around the same period,
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was a desire to get away from caveat emptor which as 
noted above, although greatly eroded by 1893, still 
applied in sales of specific goods.
In the years following the passing of the Act there
tended to be a blurring of any distinction between
description as meaning "kind" and as meaning "item of
identification." After a period of doubt it became
established that an ordinary purchase from a shop
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could be a sale by description. "...there is a sale
by description even though the buyer is buying
something displayed before him on the counters a thing
is sold by description, though it is specific, so long
as it is sold not merely as the specific thing, but as
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a thing corresponding to a description..."
The courts still had to apply the common law rules
as to representations made before the conclusion of
the contract. In T. and J. Harrison v. Knowles and 
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Foster two ships had been stated, in particulars
supplied to prospective buyers, to have a capacity of
460 tons. There was a reference to this in the
Memorandum of Sale but it was held that even though
each ship had a capacity of only 360 tons the
statements about capacity were only representations.
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At first instance Bailhache, J. stated "...where the
subject matter of a contract of sale is a specific
existing chattel a statement as to some quality 
possessed by or attaching to such chattel is a
warranty, and not a condition, unless the absence of
such quality or the possession of it to a smaller
extent makes the thing sold different in kind from the
thing as described in the contract." Fortunately for
buyers this strict rule did not find favour with the
courts and they have, through a long series of cases,
most often applied what can only be called a "common
sense" attitude. Depending on the facts of a
particular case, usually anything which might be seen
as an essential or substantial ingredient in forming
the identity of the goods is seen as being part of the 
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description.
The progressive widening of Section 13 is thoroughly
documented in all the leading texts on sale of goods.
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Such landmarks as Beale v. Taylor, where the
identity of the actual vehicle being sold was never in
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doubt, Arcos v. Ronaasen, where Lord Atkin made his
oft-cited statement that half an inch did not mean
about half an inch, and the more extreme Re Moore v. 
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Landauer, all contributed to the modern position
which is that there are very few situations which one
can envisage where a sale will not be a sale by
description. The main examples would be where the
buyer placed no reliance on the description, or where
goods are displayed without any label or notice e.g.
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vegetables in a supermarket or where any statement 
made about them is not essential to their identity.
In recent years there has been some attempt to
revitalise the distinction as between identity and
attributes. This however has on occasion been taken
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too far as in Re Moore where the contract was to
purchase 3,000 cans of fruit to be packed in cases
each containing 30 tins. A substantial part of the
goods was tendered in cases containing 24 tins. It
was held that the buyer could reject the whole
consignment. This case has been described by the
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House of Lords (in Reardon Smith Lines ) as
“excessively technical", and in the most recent
leading cases the judiciary has tended to try to
separate again the ideas of defective quality, and
correspondence with description, notably in Ashington
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Piggeries v. Hill. Hill contracted to sell to
Ashington Piggeries mink food which was to include as
an ingredient herring meal. Some of the food supplied
contained in the herring meal a preservative which was
toxic to mink. Ashington claimed damages for loss
attributable to the death of and injury to his mink.
He based his claim on alleged breaches of Sections 13
and 14. It was held that there had been no breach of
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Section 13. Lord Diplock held that the “key" to
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Section 13 was identification. Lord Hodson said "A
term ought not to be regarded as part of the
description unless it identifies the goods sold."
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Lord Wilberforce agreed: "The defect in the meal was 
a matter of quality or condition rather than of 
description. "
The effects of enacting vague, ambiguous and very
widely drawn statutory provisions are all too evident
from the history of Section 13- A case so extreme as
Re Moore was the result of a situation where the
judiciary did not really know what was expected of
it. The courts have usually been able to reach
whatever result seemed appropriate to them in the
circumstances, but have had to go through the motions
of reconciling their decisions with the Act- Lord
WiIberforce's analysis of the problem of conformity
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with description in Reardon Smith Lines is helpful
and clear, but in fact bears little relation to the
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words of Section 13 itself. Atiyah reaches the 
conclusion that "it is clear that Section 13 needs 
revision, if not outright repeal."
Despite the vast amount of judicial time and energy 
expended on the problems surrounding the term "sale by 
description", it is not possible to place a great deal 
of reliance on the effect given by the courts to 
particular phrases in contracts of sale, for each case 
turns so much on its own particular facts as to the 
goods, the parties, the terms of the contract, etc and 
for this reason the cases do not provide a guide to
the way a court will rule on another case.
Some writers have entered upon philosophical 
discussions of various esoteric points relating to the
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distinction between identity and attributes: the
"apparent uniqueness" of an article, "how specific is
93
speci-fic?" Even assuming that some distinction could
be drawn between identity and attributes, it would be
o-f little relevance in the context of sale of goods as
no categorisation could possibly be held to apply to
more than a narrow class of goods. As Lord
94
Wilberforce has said:
"...I do not believe that the Sale of
Goods Act was designed to provoke 
metaphysical discussions as to the nature of 
what is delivered in comparison with what is 
sold. The test of description, at least 
where commodities are concerned, is intended 
to be a broader, more commonsense, test of a 
mercantile character. The question whether 
that is what the buyer bargained for has to 
be answered according to such tests as men 
in the market would apply..."
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Goode suggests that Section 13 could be dropped
altogether (on the basis that a contractual
description is an express term) and provision made as
follows: the buyer should be entitled to reject and/or
pursue other remedies for breach of contract, where
the goods differ in a material respect (whether as to
description, quality or quantity) from those which the
buyer contracted to buy. The Law Commission and the
Scottish Law Commission published in 1983
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recommendations as to the reform of Section 14 but 
did not deal with Section 13. This seems to indicate 
that even if some reform of Section 14 is effected, we 
shall be left with Section 13 which, there seems to be 
little argument, is confusing, meaningless and
superfluous.
2. SECTION 14
The wording of Section 14 runs entirely against the
meaning and spirit of the Scots principle of
priceworthiness (see Section II). The English common
law as to implied warranties was extremely hard to
ascertain with any certainty and the Act is no more
clear than the cases that went before it - an
inevitable result of "codifying" the law in so
97
confused an area. The "baffling verbiage" of the 
Act is thus a problem to lawyers on both sides of the 
Border. The Scots have additional difficulties: 
Section 14 uses the word "condition" where Scots law 
would require to substitute the word "warranty" in 
order to achieve Chalmers' intended meaning.
The distinction made in Section 14 as between goods
being reasonably fit for their purpose, and being of
merchantable quality was, of course, derived from
English case law and was not a feature of the Scots
98
concept of priceworthiness. Bow attempts to analyse 
priceworthiness as consisting of two elements 
corresponding to the two concepts in Section 14; this 
however is done as a purely academic exercise and is 
not relevant to an attempt to construe the terms of 
the Act itself.
As outlined in Section III, the doctrine of caveat
emptor had been much eroded by the end of the
nineteenth century when the Bill was being drafted.
Despite the fact that it was manifestly not the case,
caveat emptor is made to look in Section 14 as though
it still represented the dominant rule. Chalmers'
1894 edition does not enlighten us as to why this was
done; indeed he states that the Section “...narrows
somewhat the already restricted rule of caveat 
99
e m p t o r The wording at the beginning of Section 14
therefore gives a most misleading impression, as the
exceptions which follow in the sub-sections are so
100
general. Brown sums up Section 14s "This section 
expresses what remains of the English rule of 'caveat 
emptor', but the rule itself is now subordinated to 
the exceptions. 1
The intention in drafting Section 14 seems to have 
been to abolish all implied warranties and then to 
reinstate the warranties which were to be recognised 
by 1 aw. The wording of the statute has the effect of 
throwing the onus onto the purchaser - there is no 
general overriding obligation of "positive morality" 
on the part of the seller.
Section 14(1) did not give rise to so many 
difficulties as Section 14(2). The passing of the Act 
was followed by a number of cases where the courts
acted very much as they did in connection with Section
13 and took a very broad and liberal view of the words
of Section 14(1). It was held that the mere naming of
an article which has a well known use or purpose was
sufficient to indicate to the seller the purpose for
101
which the goods were required. Priest v. Last was
the famous hot water bottle case in which it was held
that the very act of buying certain articles implies
the purpose for which they are required. The word
"particular" here, then, was construed as meaning
"specified", rather than "particular" as opposed to
"general". It is therefore only necessary to make
clear the use for which an article is required if this
is going to be a special or extraordinary use of the
thing in question. This was already the case in 
102
Scotland.
A good early example, which shows the courts'
103
attitude to Section 14(1), was Frost v. Aylesbury 
where it was held that: "Where a person sells an
article of food he must be taken to warrant that it is 
fit for food." The requirement that the purchaser 
show that he relied on the seller's skill or judgment 
was also very liberally construed by the courts: "The 
reliance will seldom be express: it will usually arise 
by implication from the circumstances: thus to take
...a purchase from a retailer, the reliance will be in 
general inferred from the fact that a buyer goes to 
the shop in the confidence that the tradesman has
149
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selected his stock with skill and judgment."
The judiciary seemed to regard itself as to some
degree freed from the restraints of the pre-1893 cases
by the passing of the Act. Although the acknowledged
purpose of the Act was to codify the common law
position, more weight was placed on the wording of the
Act itself than on the cases which had gone before it:
a clear example of this is Bristol Tramways v. Fiat
105
Motor Limited, in particular the judgment of
Cozens-Hardy, M.R.
Section 14(2) represented English common law as 
first set out in Lord Ellenborough's famous speech in 
Gardiner v. Gray to the effect that "the purchaser 
cannot be supposed to buy goods to lay them on a
dunghill," and developed in such later cases as Jones 
v. Just. Merchantable quality was implied in the Act 
(unless imported by usage of trade) only on a sale by 
description from a seller dealing in goods of that 
description. The restriction to goods bought by 
description was, as seen above, eliminated by the 
broad view taken by the courts of Section 13.
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Brown makes the following most misleading
statement when writing about Section 14(2): “It
involves the implied condition of merchantable 
quality, which in English law was first distinctly 
stated by Lord Ellenborough in 1815, and the
150
introduction of which has almost obliterated the 
distiction between the law of England, with its rule 
of caveat emptor, and the old law of Scotland.*' To 
imply that as from 1815 the laws of England and 
Scotland were the same as regards warranty of quality 
and the application of cai/eat emptor is grossly 
misleading and shows Richard Brown acting in his 
occasional role as apologist for the Act.
No definition of merchantable quality was given in
the Act. This resulted in considerable confusion and
divergence of opinion, much expensive litigation, and
some very doubtful decisions. Three main formulations
as to what was involved in merchantable quality became
widely used: these were the tests laid down by
Farwell, L.J. in Bristol Tramways (above), Lord Wright
in Cammell Laird & Co. v. The Manganese Bronze and 
107
Brass Co. and Dixon, J. in Grant v. Australian
108
Knitting Mills Ltd. These three main
interpretations and arguments became focused on a 
debate between two propositions: on the one hand goods 
were merchantable if saleable for the actual purpose 
for which the buyer bought the goods; on the other 
hand they were merchantable if they could be sold for 
any purpose. The details of the reasoning behind 
these various tests are too lengthy to be entered upon 
in this paper, and in any case are very well 
documented in the leading texts. The central point to 
be noted for the purpose of this paper is that there
was/is confusion and debate which led to some very
unfortunate decisions. For example, in Brown and Sons
109
v. Craiks Ltd. material was sold in the belief
that it was required for industrial use whereas it was
to be resold for making dresses. The reasoning of the
House of Lords in this case boiled down to the
question whether the cloth was marketable as
industrial cloth. Their Lordships decided that the
test given by Dixon, J. that the goods should be
saleable "without abatement of the price" was too
stringent and they relaxed the test with unfortunate
110
results, for in Cehave v. Bremer the natural
extension of Brown v. Craiks emerged. This was the
proposition that goods with minor defects wre not
unmerchantable and that the way to deal with this
problem is not to permit rejection of the goods but an
allowance against the price. There is, however, no
provision in the Act on which to base such a ruling.
Ill
It had been established in Jackson v. Rotax and it
is clear from the face of the Act that the court
cannot hold goods to be merchantable and allow the
112
buyer a rebate on the price. Goode suggests that 
Cehave would be best regarded as a case decided on its 
own most peculiar facts.
Indeed several of the leading cases have had unusual
facts. This limits their usefulness e.g. Kendall v. 
113
Lillico which produced a division of opinion in the
House of Lords and deals with the rather unusual
152
concepts of "after acquired knowledge" and goods 
becoming "retrospectively merchantable." Another 
example is Ashington Piggeries (above), the mink food 
case, which has little relevance to the ordinary 
consumer or everyday commercial transaction.
The basic problem has been, of course, that the word
"merchantable" does not denote any particular standard
of quality. Goods may be of bad quality and still
fulfil the requirement as to merchantable quality for
a particuar contract because such a variety of factors
may be relevant in any given case. Of particular
relevance are the contract price and the possible 
114
resale price. As Lord Reid put it "it is Cnotl
possible to frame, except in the vaguest terms, a
definition of merchantable quality which can apply to
115
every kind of case."
Before the Act the horse was one of the commonest
subjects of litigation, and the motor vehicle has
become its successor in the courts as well as on the
roads. All the leading text books cite a succession
of cases concerning motor cars with various defects.
These cases serve well to illustrate the limited value
of precedent in sale of goods. The merchantabi1ity or
otherwise of a vehicle depends on a great variety of 
116
variables. In particular the contract description
is relevant: what is to be regarded as merchantable 
must be decided in the light of this in each
153
particular case. The result of this is that cases
which have gone before, even where the goods are of
the same type and the questions being raised are
similar, are of only limited relevance. Even such
117
oft-cited cases as Bartlett v. Sydney Marcus Ltd. 
which concerned a second hand car, are only meaningful 
in the context of their own facts.
All these factors give rise to a situation in which
there is a high chance of finding conflicting
118
decisions on very similar facts. In Section 14 the 
Act merely succeeded in giving statutory status to an 
extremely nebulous and confused series of rootless 
cases which had developed in response to empirical 
situations. The courts have tried to decide whether 
loosely framed statutory provisions cover the
circumstances of particular cases. The way in which 
Section 14 was framed has resulted in many hours of 
fruitless effort because, as we have seen, many of the 
leading cases turn purely on their own facts. The
courts have had to consider the attributes, uses,
purposes etc of a tremendous variety of goods. That
the law shoud be uncertain and unpredictable in such a 
common and basic contract as sale of goods, affecting 
as it does almost every member of society almost every 
day, is highly undesirable per se and is frustrating 
to the Scots lawyer when he considers the centuries of 
development of clear general principles in Scots law 
before 1893.
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These are serious criticisms of Section 14. Goode
and Atiyah doubt the necessity for Section 13 (see
above). Gow expresses similar doubts as regards
Section 14. He makes the point that Section 14(2)
absorbs much of Section 14(1) i.e. goods which are of
merchantable quality are in most cases fit for their
purpose "... and indeed it is doubtful whether, in the
light of the modern construction of Section 13 there
is any serious need for Section 14 and its verbal 
119
niceties."
3. REMEDIES FOR BREACH DF WARRANTY OF QUALITY
"It must come as a startling tact that the precise
nature and extent of the legal remedies of a consumer,
or indeed any purchaser, when supplied with detective
goods, in that most common and ancient of contracts,
the contract ot sale, remains uncertain in Scots 
120
law." This tact which has been remarkable since
1893 is all the more "startling" in the era ot 
"consumerism", when the awareness ot people in general 
ot their rights has never been more accute.
The main problem with the 1893 Act as regards 
remedies is in interpreting Section 11(2) and Part V. 
The ditticulties are twotold: tirstly when is a detect 
"material", and secondly how to reconcile Section 
11(2) with Sections 13 and 14.
The common law remedy ot rescission is unattected by 
the statutory provisions. In addition there is an 
option to retain goods and claim damages. As noted in 
Section II in Scotland prior to 1856 the law was 
clears it goods turned out to be otherwise than 
priceworthy the buyer could reject them, rescind the 
contract and claim repetition ot the price and damages 
(according to circumstances). From this simple 
tormulation came the Scots precept that the contract
156
and the warrandice were one and the same, in 
121
practice.
After the Act of 1856 a distinction had to be made
between the contract and a warranty, leaving room for
the English concept of the collateral contract or
independent term. However Scots law had not developed
the English distinction between a material undertaking
(condition) breach of which justifies rescission, and
a non-material undertaking (warranty) breach of which
122
entitles only to damages. The word "material" in
this context is therefore meaningless in Scots law as,
if an undertaking is part of the contract, it is
automatically material, and if it lies outwith the
contract it is obviously non—contractual. There was
no legal distinction between major terms (English
conditions) and minor terms (warranties). This means
that Section 11(2) is somewhat puzzling. Brown 
123
(under)states that the Section "requires
interpretation." The words "material part" also occur 
in Section 62(1), but there is nowhere in the Act a 
definition of "material part" as this is to be applied 
to Scots law.
Brown attempts to explain the wording of the Section
124
by reference to Made v. Maidon (not a contract of 
sale and occurring after 1893). In that case Lord 
President Dunedin described the "well settled" 
distinction between stipulations which go to the root
157
of the contract and those which do not- However, as
Brown admits, if there had been such a distinction in
the Scots law of sale before 1893 corresponding to
conditions and warranties in English law, then Section
11(2) would have been superfluous.
125
Brown struggles bravely to make sense of the
situation using the word warranty in the different
senses ascribed to it in the two systems. One cannot
help wishing that he and other Scots lawyers had been
more vociferous before the Act became a fait 
126
accompli, as Section 11(2) displays a lack of
127
insight into the basic principles of Scots law.
128
Gow also cites Wade v. Waldon but he uses it as
an example of the harm done to the Scots law of sale
by the invasion of English principles. He points out
that in fact Lord President Dunedin's distinction,
above, was based on a dictum of Lord Blackburn in
129
Bettini v. Gye and that the "well settled" law to
which he was referring was that of England. Despite
Gow's indignation, in Scots contract law in general,
Lord Dunedin's dictum in Wade v. Waldon seems to be
130
generally accepted. It is true to say that in the
cases that went before Wade there was a degree of
confusion between "material" (i.e. substantial)
131
performance and "material" undertakings.
Brown is occasionally a master of euphemism. His
158
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commentary on Section 11 begins thus: "While the
Bill was before Parliament the adaptation of the
provisions of this section to Scotland occasioned some
difficulty, arising from differences between the
common law rules of Scotland and England." Brown sees
Section 11(2) as a new form of actio quanti minor is 
133
for Scotland. Its aim seems to have been to retain 
the actio redhibitoria while grafting on a form of 
actio quanti minor is to be used at the buyer's 
option. The alternative remedies had developed in 
England because of the warranty/condition position: 
rejection of the goods for breach of a condition, 
damages for breach of warranty.
It has been pointed out that in Section 53,
sub-section 5 is added "with all the appearance of an 
134
afterthought." Taking Sections 11(2) and 53(5)
together the conclusion might be drawn that the buyer
in Scotland has wider remedies than the buyer in
England because rejection might be permitted in
Scotland where it would not be permitted in England
135
i.e. for breach of warranty in the English sense.
This, however, may not be the case in view of the
136
decision in Millars of Falkirk v. Turpie, from
which it appears that the Scottish purchaser has first 
to establish that there is a breach in terms of 
Section 13 or 14, and then additionally establish that 
the breach is material in terms of the Act. In England 
once it has been established that there has been a
159
breach of one of the implied conditions the right of
137
rejection follows automatically. Clarke suggests
that the reasoning in Millar may have been to prevent 
unreasonable exercise of the right of rejection. 
However, as Clarke admits, the confusion as regards 
the impact of the Act on Scots law is such that it is 
not possible to say with certainty what the law is.
The general opinion of the writers of the standard
English texts on Sale of Goods is that Scotland came
138
out of Section 11 rather well e.g. Chalmers states
"In Scotland, no distinction is made between
conditions and warranties, and the right of rejection
has been much larger than in England. This right is
preserved by the Act. On the other hand the actio
quanti minor is has been much restricted in Scotland,
and when the buyer could return the goods he has not
been allowed to keep them and sue for damages. Now he
has this right..." However anything we may have
gained by way of remedies we have certainly paid for
in uncertainty and confusion. It is submitted that
because of this confusion Scots law did not gain any
advantage as regards remedies for breach of warranty
from the Act. The trend in the modern law is away from
a rigid distinction as between warranties and 
139
conditions and this fact makes the situation in
sale of goods in Scotland even more inappropriate and 
unfortunate.
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SECTION V - THE LEGACY
There have been few cases and little academic
discussion in Scots law on sale of goods since 1893.
This must not be taken as an indication that the law
is seen as being in a satisfactory state - "Bad law is
1
no better because its defects are rarely discussed."
All of the many problems enumerated above in
connection with the 1893 Act still exist today in the
form of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. As we have seen
these cover the whole field of the law of sale of
corporeal moveables and in particular property
provisions, warranties and remedies- The 1979 Act is
very closely based on the 1893 Act- It consolidates
2
all the amendments made to the 1893 Act but does not 
make new law (apart from minor alterations to take 
account of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977). The 
whole of the 1893 Act as it applied to Scotland was 
repealed- It is something of a mystery why this 
consolidating measure was enacted in 1979, as in 
January 1979 a reference was made to the two Law 
Commissions by the Lord Chancellor asking them to 
consider inter alia possible amendments to the 
statutory implied warranties as to quality and fitness 
of goods, and remedies for breach thereof.
The most pressing practical difficulties in the
167
modern law arise out of Section 14. The new S.14 
reverses the order of the provisions as to 
merchantable quality and fitness for purpose. The 
warranty as to merchantable quality is no longer 
confined to sales by description and a statutory 
definition of merchantable quality is given for the 
first time. The definition in S.14(6) was first 
enacted in the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act
1973 S.7(2). This was based on a definition
^ 3
recommended by the Law Commisions. The statutory
definition is scarcely an improvement on the old law
because it uses the terminology which gave rise to the
problems outlined in Section IV, i.e. it refers to
merchantable quality and fitness for purpose. It
appears to require goods to be fit for al1 their
normal purposes whereas the cases show it was
previously sufficient if the goods were suitable for
4
any one normal purpose, even though unfit for others.
There are several criticisms levelled at the
statutory implied term as to merchantable quality as 
presently worded. Firstly the word "merchantable" 
itself is not meaningful in modern usage. Its
application was historically to commercial 
transactions and most of the leading cases have
concerned bulk goods of a totally different type from 
those a modern day "consumer" would buy. The common 
law tests were based on the assumption that if goods 
were not suitable for one purpose they could be resold
168
and put to some other use. Even in commercial
transactions today the word "merchantable" seems
inappropriate: it is hardly a useful yardstick with
which to judge complex electronic equipment, for
example. In fact it appears that the only context in
which the word is used at all is when discussing the
5
terms of the Act. The Law Commissions have stated
"For all ordinary purposes, the word 'merchantable' is
largely obsolete today and in our view should be
replaced." The change in the kind of goods involved
in cases coming before the courts has been accompanied
by a change in the parties involved. Sales by
manufacturers and suppliers are now largely replaced
6
by sales by retailers to a consuming public. An Act 
drafted with one type of sale in mind does not work 
for another type.
A further problem which has not been solved by the
new statutory definition is the question of minor 
7
defects. It appears that goods will not be found to
be unmerchantable if they suffer from minor
imperfections. Before the statutory definition was
introduced it was very rarely the case that small
defects (if not trifling) could found a claim that
8
goods were unmerchantable. The definition is 
criticised for concentrating too much on fitness for 
purpose, and for not making it clear that other
aspects of quality such as safety, durability, and in 
particular, appearance and freedom from minor cosmetic
defects, may be relevant even though they do not
impair function. It appears that S.14(2) cannot be
invoked when e.g. a car or refrigerator is delivered
dented or scratched, if it is working satisfactorily.
The leading case on minor defects is a Scottish one,
9
Millars of Falkirk v. Turpie (occurring before the
statutory definition). It is perhaps unfortunate that
Millars of Falkirk should have been the case to reach 
the Court of Session for decision on the point of 
minor defects. It would appear from the report that 
the purchaser did not behave in an altogether 
reasonable manner as the sellers were willing to 
remedy the minor defect (an oil leak). They had, it 
is true, made an unsuccessful attempt to do so, but 
they were perfectly willing to remedy the defect 
properly. They were prevented from so doing by the 
purchaser's insistence on rejection. The point has 
been made several times in this paper that sale of 
goods cases turn on their own facts, and the court 
must have been influenced in this case by the very 
minor nature of the defect, and the behaviour of the 
purchaser in refusing to allow the sellers a second 
attempt to remedy it. It is hard to resist the
conclusion that a better test of the reaction of the
judiciary would have been a case where the car had 
been delivered with either a number of minor defects 
or a cosmetic defect such as a dent, and the seller 
was claiming that, as the car was capable of being 
driven, it was merchantable. Millars of Falkirk has
given rise to criticism of the judiciary as tolerating
10
"slipshod manufacturing standards". This seems
rather a harsh indictment considering the complex 
nature of the goods at issue, the very minor nature of 
the defect, and the sellers' attitude. It is arguable 
that Millars of Falkirk is a case that never should 
have reached the courts.
11
Goode argues that the statutory definition should
be seen as potentially wide enough to cover cosmetic
defects. He sees the word "purpose" as being capable
of encompassing the enjoyment which the buyer can
reasonably expect from his purchase including
12
aesthetic pleasure. He states that the law could
and should be construed in this manner because, to
hold goods which are defective in this respect
merchantable, means the buyer has no remedy. If it
were to be held that such defects involved a breach of
S.14 the seller would usually have the opportunity to
13
cure the breach.
14
Reynolds also argues that minor defects or defects 
of appearance may affect the fitness of the goods for 
their purposes the buyer of a new product "reasonably 
expects something that is not soiled or shoddy." 
Reynolds acknowledges, however, that whatever 
interpretation is put on the word "merchantable” in 
the new definition "The application of the notion in 
consumer situations, for example to the sale of cars,
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must often be unpredictable and unsatisfactory, and
the new definition ...does not make things any easier
15
in this respect."
Goode and Reynolds argue that an improvement in the
situation could be effected by the manner in which the
16
statutory definition is interpreted. Others opine 
that no improvement can be effected by "mere 
tinkering" with the troublesome phrases "merchantable 
quality" and "fitness for purpose" as they are now so 
outdated as to be totally irrelevant. It is submitted 
that this latter view is the preferable one. New 
statutory formulations are required to lift the law on 
sale of goods out of the rut in which it has been 
stuck for many years.
17
The Law Commissions make suggestions as to how a 
new statutory implied term might be framed, how to 
clarify the position as regards remedies for breach 
thereof and the circumstances in which the purchaser 
should have the right to return the goods and 
terminate the contract. They set out two possible 
formulations of a minimum standard of quality and 
state that the consequences of breach should be 
clearly set out in any new act. In view of the number 
and complexity of the problems which exist in 
connection with the S.G.A., the terms of reference 
given to the Law Commissions in 1979 can only be 
described as narrow. In response to the Working Paper
and Consultative Memorandum published in late 1983,
they have received views -from both Law Societies and
numerous other commercial and consumer protection
bodies. More concrete proposals are awaited in the
form of a Joint Report. While a piecemeal approach may
be seen as a practical method of achieving change
where the problems are many and complex, it is
submitted that a more general review is required. The
18
Law Commissions seem to believe that it is not too
late "to bring closer together the laws of the two
jurisdictions."
As regards property provisions, the 1979 Act does
not alter the law; all the problems outlined in
Section IV remain. Section 12 has, however, been
redrafted (in a vain attempt at elucidation of the
law) to reflect amendments made by the Supply of Goods
(Implied Terms) Act 1973. In fact the new wording does
not solve any problems. Section 12 (1) incorporates
the changes made by the 1973 Act: one of the main
difficulties with this sub-section is the continued
ambiguous use of the word "right." The word might seem
to mean "power" but there are dangers in attributing
this meaning to it, as becomes clear from cases like
19
Niblett v. Confectioners Materials Co. and cases
arising out of Section 25. There are also difficulties
arising from the fallacy of total failure of
20
consideration lying behind Rowland v. Divall 
discussed above (Section IV).
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It is not easy to see what rights over and above
those conferred by Section 12 (1) are contained in
Section 12 (2). There may be some technical
differences of English law between the two 
21
sub-sections but the position is far from clear.
Section 12 (3), applies to the situation where the
contract or the circumstances show that the seller
intends to "transfer only such title as he or a third
person may have." This makes it clear that a seller
may indicate his intention to sell a limited title.
What is being sold in such a situation? Is it an
assignation of such right as is possessed by the
22
seller or the third party at the time of the sale?
There are difficulties as to when this may be inferred
from the circumstances of a sale. Before 1893 there
23
were a number of situations where no warranty of
title was presumed to exist. Section 12 of the 1893
Act provided that "unless the circumstances of the
contract are such as to show a different intention"
the implied condition and warranties were to apply and
it was generally assumed that the qualification was
with the intention of excluding situations such as 
24
poindings.
Despite the constraints of an outmoded statute, the
law has had to develop to take account of modern
commercial conditions. One of the most obvious
25
examples is the so called "Romalpa" clause. The
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purpose of a Romalpa clause is to restore the
protection of the unpaid seller against the insolvency
of the buyer where he has given the buyer possession.
The Romalpa clause developed to take account of the
very common situation where goods are sold and
delivered on credit; as an added complication the
original buyer may have resold to a third party- Much
has been written in recent years about the Romalpa
26
clause and its many possible ramifications. It is
neither necessary nor possible to attempt a precis of
the interesting and stimulating arguments which have
27
arisen involving inter alia concepts of trust,
title, property and security without transfer of
28
possession, in Scots law- The point to be made in
this context is, that while it is most illuminating to
read the diverging views of eminent scholars on e.g.
the validity or otherwise of Lord Ross's judgment in
Emerald Stainless Steel Ltd, v. South Side
29
Distribution Ltd., it is a cause for regret that the
law is uncertain in yet another aspect of commercial
life. This fact is directly attributable to the
30
S.G.A. - referred to by T,B,Smith as “Lord Watson's 
damnosa hereditas." While many of the problems which 
arise in the Romalpa situation could be solved quite 
quickly and easily on a purely Scots law basis, the 
opportunity for so doing is of course not available.
There is no clear statement of the rights and duties 
of the parties to a contract of sale. In recent years
± / o
there has been a wealth of legislation designed to
protect the consumer, and yet his remedies in one of
the commonest of transactions are uncertain. In an
ideal legal system the law should be reasonably
certain, reasonably accesible, and reasonably easy to
comprehend. No legal system is ideal and, with the
increasingly complex organisation of society, these
aims become hard to achieve. However, even allowing
for the complexity of the subject matter and modern
conditions, it still can fairly be said that the Scots
law on sale is a hopeless muddle. The law is
uncertain, inaccessible (a mixture of Scots and
English cases and a British cross-bred statute) and
31
impossible to comprehend. If legal scholars fail in 
trying to relate the statutory provisions to the 
realities of the contract of sale in the second half 
of the twentieth century, the chances of the ordinary 
consumer or trader understanding the provisions of the 
1979 Act are indeed remote.
1. W.W.McBryde 1979 SLT (News) 225 at 226
2. the main ones are Misrepresentation Act 1967 (not 
Scotland), Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973, 
Consumer Credit Act 1974 and Unfair Contract Terms Act 
1977
3. Law Com. No.24, Scot. Law Com. No.12 (1969) para.43
4. Henry Kendall v. Lillico C19693 2 A.C. 31, and see 
Goode p. 261
5. Law Com. Working Paper No. 85 and Scot. Law Com. 
Memo. No. 58, (1983) para. 2.7
6. see Atiyah p.2
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Scots common law and is one of the few difficulties 
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S. Jackson v. Rotax Motors C19103 2 K.B. 937
9. 1976 SLT (Notes) 66
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11. p.262
12. p.265
13. Borrowman, Phillips & Co v. Free & Hollis (1878) 
4 Q.B.D. 500
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23. e.g. Morley v. Attenborough (1849) 3 Exch. 500
24. Payne v. Elsden (1900) 17 T.L.R. 161
25. so called after the first case was decided by the 
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v. Romalpa Aluminium Ltd. C19763 1 W.L.R. 676
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(News) 105; Reid & Bretton, Retention of Title for all 
sums: a Reply, 1983 SLT (News) 165
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177
31. such as W.W.McBryde and M.G.Clarke - see Articles 
referred to above
CONCLUSIONS
Apart from providing a fascinating subject for 
study, a historical comparison of the law of sale 
of goods in Scotland and England throws up a number 
of important and interesting lessons. It 
demonstrates firstly the effects of statutory 
codification where the law is not in a settled 
state: it shows the resulting confusion arising 
from cases which were not clear and which 
conflicted with each other. Another valuable 
insight is afforded when one considers the manner 
in which the English system was imposed on the 
Scottish one. This was done, for political not 
“legal" reasons, without any attempt being made to 
reconcile the one system with another nor to adjust 
the terminology used to make it meaningful in 
Scotland. Whenever it is considered that uniformity 
of legal rules is necessary and desirable (which it 
undoubtedly is in such an area as sale of goods) 
the aim should be to create a code which is 
comprehensible and meaningful in all jurisdictions 
which are involved. It is submitted that in an era 
of increasing uniformity, both within the U.K. and 
as between the U.K. and the European Economic 
Community, the story of the Sale of Goods Act has
179
relevance,in that it provides a valuable lesson on 
how not to assimilate two different sets of legal 
rules.
The next lesson is to be learned from the way the 
Sale of Goods Act was drafted. Wide, vague phrases, 
without definitions of the terms used, brought 
serious problems. The fact that these same loosely 
used expressions had no fixed meaning in the case 
law which went before the Act added to the 
problems. No matter how a code is drafted there 
will be problems to be decided by the Courts in 
such a complex area as sale of goods. The point to 
be made is that our legislation itself creates 
problems rather than helping to solve them. If 
legislation is deemed necessary then it is 
essential that definitions are provided for the 
terminology used.
Almost a century after its first enactment our 
legal system is saddled with this unclear, outmoded 
statute unsuited to the needs of almost any buyer 
or seller in 1986. This fact alone is enough to 
demonstrate the importance of what happened in 
1893. Whether and how a repetition of the mistakes 
made then could be prevented is quite another
180
matter. The foregoing account of how the Sale of 
Goods Act came to be applied to Scots law, and the 
repercussions that followed can only be seen as 
mere history if we are prepared to view our legal 
system in the same light, and to set aside our 
logical systematic principles at the dictate of 
expediency or apathy when pressure is applied,from 
whatever quarter.
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